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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Bankrolled Elites, Controlled State Television, and Payroll Trolls on Wikipedia:
Examining Russia’s Strategies in Manipulation of Opinions in the context of Ukrainian
Revolution in 2014
by
Elena Labzina
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2018
Professor Norman Schofield, Chair
Regionally influential powers are likely to pursue not just straightforward, rational policy
goals but also sophisticated long-term, possibly ideological, “milieu” goals. These objectives
may be far from obvious for an external observer and often require manipulation of public
and elites’ opinions on both domestic and international level. In our extremely digitalized
era of Big Data, opinions have to compete with the facts that is why understanding better
how they can be manipulated is crucial for both pundits and practitioners. While many
approaches exist to address the topic, this work examines three sound cases from modern
Russia in the exceptionally politically salient context of Ukrainian revolution in 2014. This
country is an excellent choice for this task being recently highly active domestically and
internationally in attempting to influence opinions and attitudes. Chapter I addresses the
hidden manipulation targeted at the Ukrainian elites that resulted in an unexpected victory
of the street protests in Kyiv. The following chapter investigates the state-controlled TV
news coverage around this time. Finally, the last part analyzes the behavior of state-political
trolls on the nationally significant Russian-language Wikipedia.

x

Chapter 1
Introduction
Broadly, my dissertation studies how current global and regional powers may influence public
and elite opinions. I perform this by looking at Russia in the context of the Ukrainian
Revolution in 2014. I chose this country as a vivid example of an advanced authoritarian
regime that mainly rules not by force but by persuasion of its competence through media
and diplomatic channels. Hence, studying its recent opinion manipulation strategies is highly
illuminating in general, and potential research conclusions extend beyond authoritarianism.
Why is “Ukrainian context“ perfect to study Russia from this perspective? First, while
it might be up to a discussion what Russia perceives as “its sphere of interest”, there is
no question in the enormous importance of Ukraine and Ukrainian politics within Russian
national politics. As Brzezinski (2012) said, “...without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an
empire, but with Ukraine ... Russia automatically becomes an empire." It is possible to agree
or disagree with Brzezinski’s views on Russia in general, but it is impossible to avoid the
theme of the empire and, hence, Ukraine, in the context of the Russian politics (Kivelson
and Suny, 2016) . Curiously, the timing of both recent Ukrainian pro-liberal revolutions in
2004 and 2014 are the same with two major “tightening the screws” on freedoms in modern
Russia. Furthermore, multiple journalist investigations on “Russian troll factories” including
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several from New York Times (e.g MacFarquhar (2018) ) revealed that their residents were
required to address the topic of Ukraine in their online comments.
The chapters in the dissertation are arranged chronologically according to the time of
their original completion. The first draft for the first part was completed in 2014, for the
second part – in 2016, and for the last part – in 2017. Another way to perceive their order is
the incremental empirical complexity. From the data-analysis view, each chapter presents a
more sophisticated data methodology than the previous one. In particular, Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4 employ original data sets that I collected. Each chapter has its own hallmarks and
contributions that I outline below.
Chapter 2, which is published in American Journal of Political Science, is co-authored
work with Olga Chyzh. It studies how a third-party, a major regional power, may ‘bankroll’
repression against protesters by influencing the local political elites. The core finding is that
it may happen even at the risk of the removal of its protégé leader, with the goal of deterring
future protests within its sphere of interest. This work presents a game theoretical study
with the empirical applications inspired by the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and the possible
Russian involvement in its events. Despite the original focus on the recent revolution in
Ukraine, the formal findings provide a general contribution to IR, and their logic is supported
by the empirical evidence from Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) on protest-campaigns
between 1899-2006. Apart from the collaborative discussion on all aspects of the paper, my
contribution to the article was developing model and characterizing its equilibria. I also
calibrated the model’s parameters, so as to apply it to case of Russia and Ukraine. Finally, I
brought my region specific expertise to bear on every aspect of the paper.
Chapter 3 is co-authored work with Mark David Nieman. This work looks at the
relationship between state-owned news coverage and military intervention in authoritarian
countries. Importantly, the state-owned television is the primary tool to influence public
opinion in such political regimes. To explore changes in coverage, the work applies a Bayesian
2

change-point model that would show shifts in the coverage patterns corresponding to the
political events. The research finds that Russian state-owned media significantly increased
its coverage of Georgia and Ukraine, in the months preceding Russia’s military interventions.
This increased coverage was often predicated with an increased discussion of traditional
Russian geopolitical rivals, such as the US. Besides collaborative discussions on the direction
of the paper, first, my contribution included the discovery and justification of the data sources:
the web pages of state-controlled Russia-24 and the privately held TVRain. Second, I was
responsible for web-scraping and data post-processing. Finally, I proposed the central method
of the paper: studying the perceived salience of the topic by looking at the frequencies of
proper names in the headlines of news channels.
In Chapter 4, I examine how online political astroturfing to promote its ideology
and self-perceptions of the regime. This phenomenon is explored by looking at Wikipedia
during the Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2016. Based upon the most recent journalist and
academic investigations, the paper proposes an algorithm to identify and classify political
astroturfing activity. It finds that political astroturfing in the Russian-Ukrainian context
involves “edit wars” and the selective deletion of information , with much of this activity
occurring on Wikipedia articles that are explicitly related to the Russian-Ukrainian crisis
in 2013-2016. Finally, the discourse analysis concludes that identified instances of political
astroturfing vividly illustrate the ever-present imperial ideology of the regime in Russia.
To sum up, from the technical perspective, parts of this dissertation present drastically
different approaches to studying how a regime can influence public and elite opinions. Chapter
2 is predominantly formal, and the empirical qualitative element serves to illuminate and
illustrate the key strategic insights that follow from the model. Chapter 3 presents an
essential web data task along with classical statistics: the Bayesian change-point model is
applied to the processed — translated and stemmed – original data in the Russian language
scraped from media websites. Finally, Chapter 3 provides a mixture of modern data science
3

approaches that combines, following the terminology of Salganik (2017) in his recent book
on “social research in the digital age”, readymades of terabytes of wiki-data and custommades
of geographical data on “troll factories” together with traditional discourse analysis.
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Chapter 2
Bankrolling Repression? Modeling
Third-Party Influence on Protests and
Repression
1

2.1

Introduction

The 2013-2014 anti-government protests in Maidan Nezalezhnosti in central Kyiv, Ukraine,
and the ensuing removal of President Yanukovich, raised much speculation within the
academic and policy communities. Despite media reports of Russian involvement, the Russian
government never officially acknowledged providing assistance in repressing the protesters.
The general opacity of the Russian government and their notoriously poor record-keeping
suggest that the details of the interactions between Yanukovich and Russia may never become
1

Olga V. Chyzh and Elena Labzina (n.d.). “Bankrolling Repression? Modeling Third-Party Influence on
Protests and Repression.” In: American Journal of Political Science 0.0. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12341. eprint:
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.12341
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publicly available. As a result, even several years later, much of the international community
and researchers are left with more questions than answers. What were possible incentives
for Russia’s involvement? What types of third parties may try to influence domestic crises
of other states? What are the consequences of such influence? Does Yanukovich’s removal
indicate that Russia’s involvement was a failure? Or did Russia gain from involvement,
despite Yanukovich’s removal?
There is ample evidence that similar third party attempts at influencing domestic crises
are not rare. US and Soviet direct and indirect involvement in their respective spheres of
interest throughout the Cold War, or Russia’s interest in the outcomes of popular protests and
revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, constitute only a few prominent examples.
Patrick M Regan and Meachum (2014) find evidence of some level of third party involvement
in approximately one third of country-years identified as “at-risk” for experiencing armed
conflict in the reasonable future between 1955-2003.2 Third parties have also provided
overt government support in approximately one-third of protest campaigns (Chenoweth and
Stephan, 2011) .
In many of these cases, third party involvement was expressed in the form of consultation,
economic and military aid, and weapons sales. Some instances of third party involvement,
however, happen in secrecy, behind closed doors. In countries with stricter records-keeping
practices and greater government accountability, such as the US, some information is usually
eventually revealed to the public (Forsythe, 1992) . Other cases may never move beyond
the realm of speculation. Despite the pervasiveness of third party involvement, this lack of
systematic data presents a considerable challenge for empirical research. We overcome this
challenge by using available information from the literature and news coverage to develop
2

Of these, third-party involvements by foreign governments make up 91% of the cases, while involvements
supporting the government make up 31% of the total.
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a game-theoretic model that allows for analyzing the interaction between the government,
protesters, and an interested third party.
The resulting model is a generalization of the traditional two-player game between the
government and the protesters through an introduction of a third player—an interested third
party.3 In our model, the onset of conflict between the government and the protesters is
possible as part of a pure strategy equilibrium, in contrast to traditional two-player games
that treat such conflict as either an off-equilibrium outcome or part of a mixed strategy
equilibrium. The pure strategy explanation for protests and repression, provided by our
model, is more intuitive than mixed-strategy equilibria, which occur under rather restrictive
parameter conditions. These parameter restrictions are also somewhat incompatible with the
empirical prevalence of government repression against protesters. A pure strategy explanation
provided by our model, in contrast, holds for a much larger parameter space, which is more
consistent with the commonality of protests and instances of state repression.
Our core finding is that third party involvement may result in repression of the protesters,
and even the removal of the protégé leader in cases, which could have ended peacefully in
the absence of a third party. The key to this finding is that, unlike much of the literature
which attributes third parties with neutral goals (e.g., mediation, concern for human rights)
or at least neutral means (e.g., avoid repression), we relax these assumptions and explore the
resulting variation. Our model allows for neutral third parties, interested third parties that
are averse to repression, and third parties that are explicitly interested in the use of repression.
Building a reputation as a coercive third party, as in the latter case, may have some benefits,
e.g., using repression to create a “scarecrow” for future protests. For example, the images of
repression at Maidan are frequently invoked as arguments against civil disobedience within
Russia and its sphere of influence (Peterson; Whitmore, 2015; 2017) . Other instances of
“scarecrow” tactics include the 1956 Soviet-sponsored repression against workers protests in
3

The two-player game is a special case of our model.
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Poznań, Poland, and student demonstrations in Budapest, Hungary, as well as the massacres
of the Eritrean-led opposition by the Soviet-supported Mengistu regime in Ethiopia.
Relaxing the assumption that the third party is motivated by a specific set of goals
allows us to derive a set of very general predictions, some counter-intuitive insights, as well
as explain a variety of third-party involvement/non-involvement scenarios, such as pressure
from a “neutral” third party to avoid repression, an interested third party’s decision to stay
out due to anticipated costs, or a repressive third party’s decision to bankroll repression
for the sake of deterring future protesters. The latter scenario, in particular, has received
little scholarly attention, despite its rather common occurrence, especially within the Russian
sphere of interest. We use Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) data on protest campaigns, as
well as some original data, to evaluate some of the predictions.

2.2

Domestic Politics and Third Party Involvement

Repression research has focused on domestic political institutions. Proponents of the domestic
democratic peace argue that democratic governments are less likely to repress protesters
than authoritarian regimes (Davenport; Richards, Webb, and Clay, 2007; 2015) , although
repression by democracies, especially in response to violent dissent, is also not uncommon
(Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Will H Moore; Davenport and Armstrong; Davenport, Armstrong, and Will H. Moore; D. W. Hill and Jones; Ritter; Ritter and Courtenay R Conrad,
2010; 2004; 2008; 2014; 2014; 2016) . Others have suggested the murder-in-the-middle
hypothesis, which points to semi-democracies or semi-autocracies as the most likely hot spots
for observing violent repression of protests (Pierskalla; Patrick M. Regan and Bell, 2010;
2010) .
This literature rarely focuses on the international determinants of domestic repression
(Gartner and Patrick M Regan; Will H Moore, 1996; 1995) . Leaders of political regimes,
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however, rarely act independent from influences of outside third parties. Minor powers often
rely for support on regional or great powers (Lake; M. D. Nieman, 2009; 2016) ; in other
cases, third parties claim (explicitly or implicitly) regional “spheres of influence,” acting as de
facto arbitrators within those areas (Lemke, 2002) . Lake (2009) , for example, argues many
governments make a conscious strategic choice to enter an informal (hierarchical) relationship
with a (usually like-minded) major/regional power, essentially as a form of an “insurance”
arrangement: a smaller power supports the major power’s international policy agenda, while
the major power enhances the smaller power’s economic or military security (Martinez
Machain and Morgan, 2013) . The degree of smaller power’s dependence on this relationship
may range from a military alliance or an economic partnership to a full-on puppet regime
that has no power beyond that given to it by the major power. While such language invokes
images of the US, USSR/Russia, or China (and their traditional spheres of interest), one
can also think of less obvious examples, such as Saudi Arabia’s or Iran’s roles in Yemen and
Syria. Such informal arrangements between domestic governments and international third
parties may have important effects on domestic policy outcomes of the protégé state.
The role of international third parties in domestic crises is better understood within the
related civil war literature (Aydin; Bapat; Findley and Teo; Gent, 2012; 2006; 2006; 2008)
. Involvement of a third party with an independent stake in the issue may affect conflict
duration (Aydin and Patrick M Regan; Cunningham, 2012; 2010) . The probability of
conflict, for instance, may decrease as a result of involvement by third parties with strong
ties to one of the conflict participants (Patrick M. Regan, 2002) . Conflict outcome may also
depend on whether the third party supports the government, the challenging group, or has a
separate interest in the issue (Andrew H Kydd; Patrick M. Regan, 2006; 2002) .
This paper extends the literature in two ways. First, we extend research on third
party involvement in civil wars to explore the effects of observed and unobserved third party
influences on the onset of protests and the government’s decision to use repression. Second,
9

unlike much of prior literature, our model relaxes the (implicit) assumption of the legitimacy
or neutrality of third party’s goals and means. Rather than assuming any specific goals
and means, third party’s broader involvement incentives are modeled via an unrestricted
parameter (β), which may represent a variety of goals and considerations, such as ending
conflict (Patrick M Regan, 1998) , preventing human rights violations (Gartner and Patrick
M Regan, 1996) , pursuit of economic and geo-strategic goals (Findley and Teo, 2006) , or
even the goal of repression for its own sake. These broader third party goals are referred to as
“milieu” goals (Wolfers, 1984) , and are distinct from the policy goals that are immediately at
stake in any given domestic crisis. Milieu goals may include establishing a certain reputation
or a sphere of influence, promoting international law or particular economic models, etc.
Milieu goals are, of course, not equivalent to normatively positive goals and depend on the
outlook/aims of the leadership of the third party: thus, milieu goals of a repressive regime
may include supporting/legitimizing undemocratic governments in other states. Russian
President Putin’s support for Assad in Syria, for example, may partially stem from his own
domestic insecurities (F. Hill, 2013) .
In addition to the nature of their milieu goals, third parties also differ in their legitimacy
of means, i.e. whether they consider coercion as an acceptable means for the pursuit of their
milieu goals. Whereas some third parties view coercion as an acceptable if undesirable means,
others may find it completely unacceptable (e.g, Gorbachev famously refused to support
coercion against protests in East Germany in 1989, whereas his predecessors assisted in
suppressing protests in Hungary and Poland in 1956.) We refer to third party’s acceptance
of coercion as a means of achieving its milieu goals using the terms “marginal” (coercion
is an acceptable means) vs. “legitimate” (coercion is not an acceptable means) third party.
An obvious complication is that the content of milieu goals is not always independent of
the means that the third party may view as acceptable. A reputation as a coercive third
party may have its benefits: brutality and massacres have been long used as effective tools
10

for deterring future challenges in authoritarian regimes. And vice versa: a third party may
derive an additional benefit from pursuing its goals through non-coercive means.
Third parties pursue their policy and milieu goals within their spheres of interest using
“the power of the purse”: they may attempt to “sweeten” the government’s policy concessions
with grants or favorable-term loans, military equipment, expertise, or even personnel to back
those policies (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith; Licht, 2007; 2010) . Consider, for example, the
agreement between Ukraine’s Yanukovich and Russia, in which Russia agreed to lower natural
gas prices as well as purchase 15 billion in Ukrainian-issued bonds. Notably, the signing of
this agreement coincided with Yanukovich’s announcement to withdraw from negotiations
of Ukraine’s association status with the EU (Interfax-Ukraine, 2013) . Similar patterns
are observed in Russia’s efforts to legitimize the long-time rule of Belarus’ Lukashenka
through regular diplomatic missions, generous foreign aid, oil subsidies, and debt forgiveness
(Ambrosio, 2006) .

2.3

Theoretical Model of Protests and Repression

Our game focuses on the interaction between three actors: Government (G), Protesters
(P), and a Third Party (T). The government is the ruling leader(s) that has the executive
decision-making power in the state. The protesters are made up of activists within the
society. Finally, the third party is a foreign entity, such as a major/regional power (e.g.,
France in West Africa) or a neighboring state. The third-party and government have the
same preference ordering regarding the policy outcome, disputed by the protesters.
We assume that the government and third party are in a quid-pro-quo relationship, such
that the government trades some of its policy autonomy in exchange for the third party’s
resources, security guarantees, or other benefits. In the extreme, such a policy dependency
between the governments of asymmetrically empowered states results in a “puppet” regime in
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the weaker state. A more general example of such a relationship, however, is that in which
the state leader fulfills the role of a protégé of third party, i.e. has significant autonomy over
her country’s domestic policies, yet consults/defers to the third party on particular issues.
Many developing states defer to the United States on economic policies. Similarly, many
post-Soviet states, such as Belarus or Kazakhstan, while exercising relative autonomy on
their domestic policies, tend to consult Russia on foreign policy.
We further assume that, while the third party and the ruling government are in
agreement regarding the policy outcome on the particular issue disputed by the protesters,
the broader interests of the third party and the government are not in perfect alignment
(Lake; M. D. Nieman, 2009; 2016) . Specifically, we assume that while, all else equal, the
third party prefers that its protégé-leader remain in power (i.e., is not overthrown by the
protesters), this preference may be outweighed by third party’s milieu goals. Throughout the
20th century, for example, the United States had to balance its relationships with a number of
corrupt governments in Latin America and the Middle East (e.g., the Somozas of Nicaragua,
Mubarak of Egypt) with its broader goals (e.g., international law, liberal economic policies).
The status quo distribution of benefits in the society privileges the government and
its supporters and disadvantages the group represented by the protesters. These societal
cleavages may be based on specific policy disagreements, as well as other factors (e.g., ethnicity,
religion, access to resources). For the sake of parsimony, we abstract away from the precise
source of these disagreements and simply assume that the protesters and government disagree
over policy x. The disputed policy outcome is modeled as an indivisible zero-sum good of
value normalized between 0 and 1, so that the party that obtains its preferred policy obtains
the benefit of 1, while the party that does not obtain its preferred policy outcome gets the
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payoff of 0.4 The third party is assumed to possess the resources to influence the resolution
of the disagreement.
The scope of protesters’ demands is thus narrowed to issues that concern broad swaths of
the population and/or multiple societal layers—hence the interest/involvement of a third party.
Such demands may require major institutional reform (e.g., empowering a disenfranchised
group), administrative change (e.g., autonomy), or a major policy orientation (e.g., 1975
Lebanese Civil War started as a movement against the pro-Syrian policy orientation of the
government).5
The game starts with Nature, N, determining the type of protesters, who are Strong
with probability α and Weak with probability 1 − α. The protesters’ type is conceptualized as
strong or weak relative to the government. If repressed, Strong protesters (SP ) will overthrow
the government, while Weak protesters (WP ) will be defeated. Protesters know their own
type, but the government and third party have to form a set of beliefs about the type of
protesters they are facing. After N moves, the protesters have to decide whether to challenge
(C) the government or not (¬C).
If the protesters do not challenge, the game ends with the Status Quo outcome. In this
outcome, the government receives a payoff of 1, associated with implementing its preferred
policy; the protesters receive a payoff of 0, as they do not get their preferred outcome; and
the third party, whose preferred policy outcome aligns with that of the government, obtains
the payoff of 1.
If the protesters decide to challenge and take to the streets, this sends a signal regarding
their type to the third party, and the third party responds by choosing a level of assistance
4

The Appendix discusses the consequences of relaxing this assumption. As an extension, protesters’
demands may also be modeled as a function of their capacity, e.g., Thomas, Reed, and Wolford (2016) .
5
The equilibrium analysis presented below reveals that, depending on the actions of the government and
the third party, these types of demands may lead to an empirical observation of no protests (Deterrence
equilibrium), as well as small-scale protest events, or even protest campaigns. For instance, the model makes
no clear predictions of protest size for the Accommodation equilibrium, i.e. the government may accommodate
pre-emptively, after observing a single protest event, or as a result of a protest campaign.
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k ≥ 0 that it is willing to give the government to help repress the protesters and compensate
it for a possible loss of office. The game ends with the government’s choice of whether to
repress the protesters (R) or not (¬R). Assume r > 0 is the cost of repressing the protests,
which may include paying the internal police, buying the necessary weapons, etc. Then the
total government expense on repressing equals r − k, as the third party pays the cost k.
The government’s use of repression against Weak protesters results in the Successful
Repression outcome. Third-party assistance increases the level of repression against the
protesters by k (e.g, through availability of superior weapons or adding to the size of the
internal police). The protesters fail to obtain their preferred policy and pay the cost of
repression, which yields them a payoff of −r − k.6 The third party obtains its preferred
outcome minus the assistance amount k. Should the third party get involved in a domestic
crisis in its protégé state, its payoff also includes the milieu goals parameter β.7 The direction
(positive/negative) of β depends on third party’s legitimacy of means: a marginal third
party that views coercion as an acceptable tool has a negative β-parameter (β < 0), while a
legitimate third party, that decries coercion, has a positive β-parameter (β > 0). The absolute
value (size) of β, however, depends on both the importance/benefits of getting involved in a
particular case in pursuit of milieu goals minus the expected costs, such as risk of economic
sanctions or conflict with other third parties. As a result, the absolute value, and to a lesser
extent, the sign of β may vary on a case-by-case basis, as the same third-party may have
different milieu-related incentives to intervene in different cases. For example, due to shared
history, language, and ethnic origin, Russia may have different values of β for intervening
in Ukraine than for intervening in Kyrgyzstan. Although likely negative in both cases (as
6

A more precise way to model the effect of k would be to allow the government to spend a proportion of k
on additional repression and the leftover amount as compensation for loss of office, i.e. Strong protesters’
payoff would equal 1 − r − θk. We formally explored the effects of such a complication and concluded they
are not consequential for the predictions of interest.
7
As a simplification, we equate the third party’s preference that its protégé remain in power with its
preference for a particular policy outcome, i.e. third party’s benefit from preserving its protégé is part of the
policy benefit that equals to 1.
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Russia has long demonstrated its acceptance of coercive means), Russia’s β may be larger in
absolute value in the case of Ukraine than in the case of Kyrgyzstan. Analogously, Britain,
France, and the United States may have all had negative β during the height of the Cold
War (as evidenced by their general acceptance of coercive means to fight communism), but
the size of their β may have varied from case to case, depending on geo-strategic importance,
risk of Soviet involvement, economic and cultural ties to the location, etc. (Carment and
Rowlands, 1998) .
Finally, if a third party is uninterested/indifferent towards an outcome of the case, then
its β-parameter is 0. This would happen, for example, if a state is unimportant to the pursuit
of the third party’s milieu goals (a state without geo-strategic or economic importance) or the
benefits of getting involved do not outweigh the costs (e.g., Russia’s benefits from intervening
in a NATO member, like the Baltic states, may not be worth the possible costs of conflict
with its NATO allies). In either of these scenarios, β = 0, which means that the third party
would have nothing to gain, on balance, from helping the government repress the protesters.8
As a result, the use of repression against Weak protesters leads to a payoff of 1 −
k − β I[k > 0] to the third party. Since third party’s ability to promote its milieu goals is
conditional on its involvement in the crisis, the parameter β is multiplied by an indicator
variable I, which takes on the value of 1 when k > 0, and 0 otherwise. If the third party does
not get involved (k = 0), then it derives no cost or benefit related to its milieu goals. Finally,
the government obtains its preferred outcome minus the costs of repression plus the third
party assistance, for the payoff of 1 − r + k.
The use of repression against Strong protesters results in the Removal from Office
outcome. In this case, the protesters obtain their preferred policy outcome minus the cost of
8

Note that, within our game, an indifferent third party is not equivalent to a neutral third-party. As long
as a neutral third-party has an interest in helping resolve the conflict, it must have a non-zero value of β.
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repression 1−r −k.9 The third party’s payoff from this outcome equals to −k −β I[k > 0]. As
earlier, β is multiplied by an indicator variable I[k > 0], so that the third party’s reputation
is only affected, should it provide non-zero assistance k. Finally, the government pays the
cost of repression, r, as well as that of removal from office, y (y > 0), obtaining the payoff of
−y − r + k.
If the government does not repress (¬R) (whether against Weak or Strong protesters),
the game ends in the Accommodation outcome. In this case, the protesters obtain their
preferred policy outcome for a payoff of 1, while both the third party and the government
obtain the payoffs of 0. If the government chooses ¬R, then the third party’s assistance k
is not disbursed (i.e. the third party keeps it). The government, in other words, cannot
choose to accept k and forgo repression. For example, when, during the Orange revolution,
Ukraine overturned the results of the fraudulent 2004 election and installed a pro-Western
leader, Russia responded by removing Ukraine’s natural gas subsidies (Nygren, 2008) . The
structure and payoffs of the game are presented in Figure 2.1. To help keep track of notation,
Table 2.1 provides a summary of all the parameters and their constraints.
[Figure 2.1, and Table 2.1]

2.3.1

Equilibria

The full solution to the game is presented in Appendix. The game has three pure strategy
equilibria: Leader Removal, Deterrence, and Accommodation.
Removal Equilibrium is summarized as:



SG = R, b = 1; ST = k ∗ = y + r, a = 1; SSP = C; SW P =¬C;


1 − 2r − y > 0, r + y < −β
9

Granting of the particular policy demand is likely be a pre-condition for the next leader. Protesters,
however, gain no additional utility from regime change, i.e. our model is agnostic on whether the new leader
will be more or less favorable to other protesters’ grievances beyond the policy that led to the regime change.
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with payoffs:




USP (EQ1) = 1 − 2r − y








UW P (EQ1) = 0







U
(EQ1) = 0
G|SP




UG|W P (EQ1) = 1








UT P |SP (EQ1) = −y − r−β







U
(EQ1) = 1,
T P |W P

where a and b denote government and third party’s beliefs that the protesters are of the
Strong type.
In this equilibrium, we observe the onset of protests only when protesters are of the
Strong type (Weak protesters are deterred); the government uses repression, irrespective
of the protesters’ type; and the third party provides the government with an assistance
k ∗ = y + r to help offset the expenses associated with repression and/or the cost of losing
office.
This equilibrium only exists is the presence of a marginal third party β < 0, and does
not exist in the two-player version of the game (see Appendix for Lemma 2). The dynamics
of the game that correspond to this equilibrium, therefore, constitute the core of the paper’s
contribution and help understand the previously unexplored effects of involvement by a third
party. In less technical terms, the Removal equilibrium occurs when the third party is of the
marginal type: it stands a lot to gain from involvement (β is large in absolute value) and
is not averse to bankrolling repression in pursuit of its goals (β is negative). An additional
condition is that the costs of repression, r, and leader removal, y, are low to moderate. Third
parties that derive a benefit from building a reputation as coercive powers that are not to be
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challenged, such as the USSR/Russia, fit these requirements especially well.10 When these
conditions are met, a marginal third party would provide sufficient resources to repress the
protesters.
In the game, protesters can anticipate this outcome, and hence, only Strong protesters—
those that are prepared to fight—challenge the government. The use of major repression
against Strong protesters is, of course, risky from the perspective of the leader. For example,
while the initial protester demands in Maidan related to the country’s pro-EU orientation,
the first use of repression resulted in cries for Yanukovich’s resignation and prosecution. Live
images of government brutality against the protesters in Maidan attracted international
attention, which further increased the stakes for the Yanukovich regime. Importantly, within
the game, these increasing stakes for the leader are recognized by both the leader and the
third party: the third party chooses to bankroll repression despite the increasing risk of the
removal of their protégé leader. In this equilibrium, brutal repression, which helps accomplish
its milieu goals, is more important for the third party than the policy at stake and keeping
their protégé in power. The protégé leader also recognizes the risks, but since her tenure in
office and post-tenure fate depend on third party’s continued support, she uses repression if
such is the preference of the third party, even despite the risks.
This logic is supported by empirical evidence. Using Chenoweth and Stephan (2011)
data on protest campaigns between 1899-2006, Table 2.2 provides a cross-tabulation of
government use of major repression, based on whether it received overt third-party support.11 It shows that third-party involvement substantially increases the probability of major
10

In contrast, if the third party viewed the use of repression as a (unavoidable) cost, the absolute value for
β will be smaller, which would make such a third party less likely to meet the condition.
11
A protest campaign—defined as “as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in
pursuit of a political objective” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) —is a distinct type of a protest event from
a small-scale riot or a localized protest. Data on protest campaigns is appropriate for analyzing the Removal
equilibrium, as this equilibrium predicts that the protests are sufficiently continuous and purposive to pose a
threat to the leader’s security in office.
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repression—a 7 percentage-point difference. And these results are likely to be conservative,
due to a lack of data on covert third party support.
For further empirical evaluation, we expanded the subset of cases of major repression
in the presence of overt third party support (cases in the bottom right cell of Table 2.2) from
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) data to include several additional variables, such as whether
the protests resulted in the removal of the leader, the post-tenure fate of such leaders, and
the country name of the third party.12 First, we find that, in the presence of third party
support, engaging in major repression results in a rather high rate of leader removal from
office (approximately 70% of the cases).13 Next, Table 2.3 summarizes the post-tenure fate of
protégé leaders who were removed as a direct result of using repression against protesters.
Consistent with the model, the third party seems to compensate their protégés for a loss of
office: a large majority of such leaders—76%—enjoys a safe retirement in their own country,
the third-party state, or another friendly state.14
[Table 2.2, Table 2.3, and Table 2.4 here]
Of course, this equilibrium only occurs for marginal third-parties (Lemma 2), so a
more accurate evaluation of empirical evidence would account for third-party type. As
preliminary evidence, Table 2.4 breaks up the cases based on the (primary) sponsoring third
party and temporal period. Although it is admittedly difficult to devise an accurate measure
of third-party type β, the temporal period may serve as a proxy for an increase in β for
the United States and Britain, due to their increased post-1990 emphasis on human rights.
Consistent with the model expectations, we see a substantial decrease in the number of
12

See Data section of Appendix for data and coding rules.
We may speculate that, in the rest of the cases, the leader is able to remain in power, despite the use of
repression, by using third party’s resources to pay off supporters. Moving from a deterministic theoretical
model to a probabilistic empirical one, we may think of y as a function of the probability of removal q and a
cost of removal ζ, (i.e., y = qζ). Third party’s assistance that compensates the leader for possible loss of
power y then may represent resources that leader may use to remain in power and/or spent to ensure his/her
post-tenure safety.
14
Unfortunately, data on leaders removed (regularly or irregularly) as a result of using repression in the
absence of a third party are not currently available for comparison.
13
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repressive leaders sponsored by the United States in the post-1990 time period, while the
corresponding number for Russia is still high: there are 7 cases in which repressive leaders,
sponsored by Russia, found a safe retirement in the post-1990 years, in contrast to only 2
cases for the US. In the pre-1990 period, both superpowers tended to engage in much more
sponsorship of repression in third-party states, guaranteeing a safe retirement to 11 (USSR)
and 12 (US) leaders.
Deterrence Equilibrium is summarized as:



SG = R, b =α ; ST = k ∗ = y + r, a =α ; SSP =¬ C; SW P =¬ C


1 − 2r − y < 0, r + y < −β
with payoffs:




USP (EQ2) = 0







U (EQ2) = 0
WP




UG (EQ2) = 1







UT (EQ2) = 1
This equilibrium can only occur under conditions that are characteristic of repressive
regimes that are sponsored by a marginal third party. Neither protests nor repression
constitute part of this expected equilibrium outcome, i.e. the government is able to deter any
protests (weak or strong) (Ritter and Courtenay R Conrad, 2016) . It is of interest that,
were the protests to occur, the cost of repressing them is fully covered by the third party
assistance k ∗ , which compensates the government’s expenses, associated with repression, as
well as the costs of removal from office, if necessary. The third party’s guarantee of economic
help, in other words, is what enables the government to effectively deter the protesters.
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Accommodation Equilibrium is summarized as:



SG =¬ R, b = α; ST = k ∗ = 0, a = α; SSP = C; SW P = C;


α >

1−r
,
1+y

r + y > −β

with payoffs:




USP (EQ3) = 1







UW P (EQ3) = 1



UG (EQ3) = 0







UT P (EQ3) = 0
In this equilibrium, referred to as the Accommodation Equilibrium, the government allows
protests and, rather than repressing, tends to find a sustainable accommodation outcome.15
It is noteworthy that rather than reflecting of the government’s tolerance, attributed to
liberal democratic regimes, this equilibrium is merely a function of third party’s decision
against “bankrolling” repression. The government’s use of repression, or lack thereof, in other
words, is solely determined by the third party. In this case, the third party does not provide
k, because it has a high prior belief that the protesters are strong enough to overthrow the
government. As long as repression is costly (r > 0), the government does not repress any
protesters without the help of a third party.
Taken together, the three pure strategies equilibria help explain the known empirical
regularity that protest campaigns are overwhelmingly successful. The overall success rate
of protest campaigns is 54%, which increases to 60%, when the government receives overt
support from a third party (a summary of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) data).16 The
15

Accommodation equilibrium, however, does not rule out leader removal, i.e. leader removal may itself be
the demand of the protesters.
16
Successful cases are defined as those that resulted in at least partial concessions.
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intuition is that potentially unsuccessful cases of Weak protesters are deterred from challenging
the government in both of the equilibria, in which the government uses repression (Removal
and Deterrence). Weak protesters, therefore, only challenge the government as part of the
Accommodation equilibrium, which results in government concessions. Protest failures, in
other words, are less likely to be observed and recorded in the data than protest successes.

2.4

Implications

The game clarifies the causal mechanisms behind the observed outcomes of repression, removal,
and accommodation, as well as the frequently unobservable outcome of deterrence. In what
follows, we zero in on two types of insights: those that link the outcome with the type of
third party, and those that explore the effects of domestic institutional variation.

2.4.1

Third Party Type

We now turn to T ’s decision regarding the amount k that it allocates to G. Since T is an
uninformed actor, selecting which type of equilibrium will occur in the game boils down to
the exogenous parameter values in T ’s expected utilities. There exist ranges of β that allow
for each of the pure strategy equilibria, or preclude the existence of certain equilibria. The
first insight is that a negative β is a necessary but not sufficient condition for either the
Removal or the Deterrence equilibria: third party’s acceptance of coercive means does not,
by itself, guarantee that it is willing to bankroll repression in any particular case.
To illustrate this, Figure 2.2 displays the parameter spaces for each equilibrium as a
function of the cost of repression, r, on the horizontal axis, and third party type and interest,
β, on the vertical axis, while holding the cost of leader removal at a moderate value (y = 0.5).
Figure 2.2 shows that the game provides unequivocal pure strategy predictions regarding
the outcome of the interaction between the three players, for any set of parameter values.
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The parameter space that allows for Accommodation exists under all, even very negative
values of β, although its area increases/decreases with changes in β. If we think of the costs
of repression as proportional to the spontaneity and size of the protests, this insight may
explain why even coercive third parties are known to back down when faced with spontaneous
massive protests (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) . For example, the United States promptly
withdrew its support for Marcos’ regime in Philippines, faced with the overwhelming size
of the protests in 1986. The value of US’s β, although negative (as they continued to prop
Marcos despite instances of previous repression), was not large enough in absolute size to
justify the enormous costs of repressing a massive protest. Instead, the United States stayed
out of the conflict and the protesters obtained their demand of Marcos’ resignation. In
contrast, had the protest been less spontaneous, Marcos might have been able to use US aid
to prevent its occurrence in the first place.
[Figure 2.2 here]
A similar logic may also explain why Russia did not assist with repression during the
Orange Revolution in 2004, but did during the Maidan protests in 2013-2014. Although
Ukraine has consistently been at the center of Russia’s milieu goals (large absolute value of
β), and Russia is generally accepting of coercion in its domestic and foreign policies (β < 0),
the Orange Revolution, which was the first large-scale and spontaneous protest campaign
in post-Soviet Ukraine, took Russia by surprise (Beissinger, 2013) . Having learned from
the experience of the Orange Revolution, Russia was more prepared for a popular protest,
when its long-term protégé, Yanukovich, backed out of signing the EU Association treaty,
at Russia’s insistence. Maidan protests, in other words, may have been as large in size,
but were less unexpected by the Russian government: since the cost of repression on longer
notice is lower than that on shorter notice, the resulting equilibrium outcome shifted from
Accommodation in 2004 to Removal in 2014.
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A second insight is that the threshold value of β that rules out the two coercive equilibria
(Deterrence and Removal ) actually falls below zero. This insight challenges the basic intuition
that marginal third parties (β < 0) will always bankroll repression. This finding also provides
an intuition of what type of third parties may act as neutral ; why even marginal third parties
may act neutral in some cases; and why the same third party may act as neutral in some, but
not all cases. In particular, as long as β exceeds a certain negative threshold β ∗ , third party’s
milieu benefits do not outweigh its costs of bankrolling repression, in which case it prefers
to act as an indifferent bystander (do nothing), or even a neutral mediator (e.g., provide
non-coercive assistance).
One implication, in particular, is that third-party’s decision to stay out of a domestic
crisis is not necessarily indicative of its lack of interest (β = 0) or unacceptability of coercive
means (β > 0). If we were to draw a horizontal line at β = 0, the area below that line and
above the diagonal line β ∗ corresponds to the parameter space, in which a marginal third
party with an interest in the interaction (β < 0) will act indistinguishable from a neutral or a
legitimate third party, i.e. will provide no assistance with repression. This happens when the
cost of bankrolling repression does not outweigh the milieu benefits: e.g., Egypt was forced
to withdraw its aid to Yemen’s al-Sallal regime after its devastating losses in the Six Day
War, which moved the outcome from a possible Removal equilibrium to the Accommodation
equilibrium, in which al-Sallal was removed in a “bloodless coup” (Bidwell, 1994) . Another
example is the United States’ decision to withdraw support from their long-term protégé,
the Somozas of Nicaragua: although not fully averse to repression, the United States did not
view a repressive outcome as a milieu benefit in itself (negative, but small absolute value of
β), and hence, gave up Somoza as his regime’s brutality started attracting international and
domestic attention. US’ withdrawal of support for Mubarak in response to 2011 mass protests
serves as an example of a legitimate third party with an important and not selfless stake in
an interaction acting indistinguishable from a neutral third party. This insight fits nicely
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within the existing research on mediation that argues that “neutral” third parties frequently
have ulterior motives (Findley and Teo, 2006) .

2.4.2

Institutional Features and Repression

The theoretical model also speaks to institutional explanations for protest–repression interactions. In particular, our model sheds light on the effect of two important institutional
features—the cost of repression r and the cost of a removal from office y. Both of these
parameters are proxies for institutional features known to affect the probability of protests
and repression. The costs of repression may serve as a proxy for regime transparency; Belletal:2012, for example, find that the presence of human rights organizations may decrease
repression by increasing the government’s cost through publicizing the abuses. Courtenay R
Conrad (2014) , similarly, shows that a leader’s cost of repression increases in the presence of
independent judiciaries.
The second institutional feature—leader’s cost/punishment as a result of a removal—
has been previously linked to a leader’s level of institutional constraints. Leaders of less
institutionally constrained regimes, such as personalist autocrats, face higher costs of removal
than more constrained leaders. For example, while removal from office is rarely accompanied by
additional punishments in democracies, deposed leaders of nondemocratic regimes frequently
face additional penalties, such as exile, imprisonment, or even execution (Debs and Hein E
Goemans, 2010) .
The model helps understand the interplay between these two parameters and the outcome
of the protests. To highlight this aspect of the model, Figure 2.3 provides a visualization.
The x-axis displays a range of possible repression costs r, and the y-axis displays a range of
costs of removal from office y, while β is constrained to the range associated with a marginal
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third party,17 and the probability that the protesters are strong, α, increases as we move
from left to right between subfigures.
[Figure 2.3 here]
First, the figure highlights that, as long as the costs of repression are high, otherwise
repressive regimes may appear non-repressive and accommodate rather than repress protesters.
The Accommodation equilibrium exists for any value of the cost of removal from office. If we
think of the costs of removal from office as a proxy of whether a regime is democratic, this
prediction would suggest that both authoritarian and democratic regimes may accommodate
protesters if the cost of repression is sufficiently high (e.g., the regime is monitored by human
rights organizations).
Next, the figure shows the combination of parameters for the Deterrence equilibrium, in
which the presence of a marginal third party helps deter protests against the regime through
the threat of repression. Holding third party’s preference for repression constant, we see
that whether the parameter space is conducive to the Accommodation or the Deterrence
equilibrium largely depends on the belief that the protesters are strong, α: as this belief
increases (move from the left subfigure to the right subfigure), so does the area associated
with the equilibrium in which the protesters obtain the concessions, despite the governments’
relationship with a marginal third party. When the belief that protesters are strong is
moderate or high (e.g., α = 0.6 in the right subfigure), both authoritarian and democratic
regimes accommodate the protesters’ demands.18 When the belief that protesters are strong
is low (e.g., α = 0.2 in the left subfigure), a regime may act in a repressive manner (i.e. deter
protests through the threat of repression).
17

We focus on the marginal third party equilibria, as legitimate third parties never bankroll repression.
The threshold is α > .5. When α = 0.5, 1 − 2r = (1 − r)(α) − 1, i.e. the two equilibria conditions,
represented by solid lines in Figure 2.3 overlap. To enhance visualization, we therefore hold α at 0.6 rather
than 0.5 in the right subfigure.
18
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Third, the model speaks to the literature on individual leader outcomes (Hein E
Goemans; Henk E Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2008; 2009) . As the separating
equilibrium is the only equilibrium, in which protests, repression, and leader removal are part
of the observed outcome, our model helps identify the parameter space that increases the
risk of a leader’s removal. According to the logic of the model, the separating equilibrium is
observed when (1) strong protesters have a positive expected utility, even after accounting
for the costs of repression, 1 − 2r − y > 0, (2) when the third party is of the marginal type ,
β < −r − y, and (3) when the third-party and the government expect challenges only from
the strong protesters, a = b = 1. As highlighted in Figure 2.3 and conditions (1)-(2), this
equilibrium is possible when both the cost of leader removal, y, and the cost repression, r,
are relatively low, i.e. are justified by the milieu benefits for the third party.
The second of the above conditions implies that leaders are most likely to be removed
from office when the costs of repression are low for the third party. Costs of bankrolling
repression, for example, may be lowered by close collaboration/interconnectedness between
the internal police and security apparati of the third party and its protégé governments (e.g.,
close cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian internal security forces). Greater degrees
of dependence between the third party and its protégé make it easier (less costly) for the
third party to bankroll repression, and also install a new protégé leader in the future, should
the current leader be removed as a result of repression. This prediction sheds light on the
motivating example of Ukraine, as well as on a number of other cases of removal of leaders
propped up by third parties.

2.5

Conclusion

State responses to popular protest have traditionally been modeled as a domestic phenomenon.
Such studies often treat international influences in structural rather than strategic terms
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(e.g., control for proximity to a major power). Growing empirical evidence, however, suggests
that, in a significant number of cases, the domestic-level interaction between the government
and the protesters may be affected by involvement of an outside third party with its own
stakes in the matter. The current study zeroes in on third-party involvement with the goal
to affect the protester’s decision to challenge the government and the government’s response
to such a challenge.
The study contributes to the understanding of the relationship between state leaders and
their domestic audiences in cases, where the leader herself depends on support from an outside
third party. Approaching the interaction from a game-theoretic perspective, we identify the
conditions, under which the leader may choose to engage in inefficient repression against the
protests, even at the risk of her own removal from office. We show that this puzzling outcome
is possible, when the leader’s response to protests is influenced by an outside third party
with broader regional or systemic goals. In the motivating example of Ukraine, Yanukovich
is the protégé leader, and Russia acts as his third party sponsor. Yanukovich’s abrupt
withdrawal from the EU Association treaty—a policy highly sought by a significant part of
the population—triggered the Maidan protests. Despite every indication of the protesters’
strength—their large numbers that counted in hundreds of thousands, their willingness to
brave the cold of Ukrainian winter, and the threat of police brutality—Yanukovich made
no serious attempts at accommodation, choosing instead to repress, despite the high risk of
removal. We explain this outcome by zeroing in on Russia’s role in the crisis, in light of its
chief concern with creating a “scarecrow” to help prevent other “Maidans” within its sphere
of influence. Russia provided Yanukovich with both the means to carry out the repression
against the protesters, and the safe option to flee the country into a comfortable retirement.
Our study also contributes to the game-theoretic literature on the onset of protests
and repression, much of which has treated inefficient repression as off-equilibrium behavior
([ [) ]Ritter:2014, Pierskalla:2009. We can certainly treat Yanukovich’s decision to turn
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Kyiv’s Independence Square into a bloodbath as a terrible blunder. While plausible, such
an explanation, however, is rather unsatisfying. Moreover, given what we know about the
close relationship between Yanukovich and Russia, a more satisfying explanation would help
provide insights regarding the reasons for, and implications of, possible Russian involvement.
Some research treats repression as part of a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which Strong
protesters challenge the government with some positive probability, and the government
mixes between opting for repression and accommodation. One way to think of the mixed
strategy equilibrium is that, from time to time, governments accept some risk of losing office
and incurs the costs of repression, in order to deter some future protests. E.g., Maidan was
a calculated risk on the part of Yanukovich, in an attempt to intimidate future protesters.
Mixed-strategy equilibrium explanations, however, are rather unintuitive. For cases with
evidence of third-party involvement, repression as a part of pure strategy equilibria, as in our
model, is both more intuitive and satisfying.
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Tables and Figures

Figure 2.1: An Extensive-Form Three-Player Game of Protests and Repression with Incomplete Information about Protesters’ Type
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Figure 2.2: Effect of Third-Party Milieu Goals and Means (β), and the Cost of Repression
(r) on Equilibria Outcomes.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Regime Type Parameters (y and r) on Equilibria Outcomes
α=0.6, β<−r−y
1

1

α=0.2, β<−r−y

EQ1: Removal

1
α−
r)/

0

0

r

2
1−

y=

−1
−r)/α

y=(1

EQ1: Removal

EQ3:
Accommodation

−
(1

Cost of Removal from Office, y
.2
.4
.6
.8

EQ2:
Deterrence

y=

Cost of Removal from Office, y
.2
.4
.6
.8

EQ3:
Accommodation

0

.2

.4
.6
Cost of Repression, r

.8

1

0

32

.2

.4
.6
Cost of Repression, r

.8

1

Table 2.1: Game Parameters
Parameter
α
r
β
y

Description
Probability that the protester’s are strong
Cost of repression
Third party’s broader cost/benefit from
achieving milieu goals
Cost of being removed from office
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Constraints
0<α<1
r>0
−∞ < β < +∞
y>0

Table 2.2: Overt Support for the Government by a Third-Party State During a Protest
Campaign, 1899-2006

No Overt 3rd Party Support
for Government
Overt 3rd Party Support
for Government
Total

Major Repression
No
Yes
Total
31
188
219
(14.16) (85.84) (100)
7
(6.73)
38
(11.76)

97
(93.27)
285
( 88.24)

104
(100)
323
(100)

Source: Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) . Numbers in parentheses represent percent, by row. χ21 = 3.74, p = 0.053
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Table 2.3: Post-Tenure Fate of Protégé Leaders, 1899-2006
Safe Retirement
Stayed in Country 22
17
Exile
Total:
39

43%
33%
76%

No Safe Retirement
Imprisoned 6 12%
Executed
2 4%
Total:
8 16%
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Indeterminable
Natural Death 2 4%
Assassinated
2 4%
Total:
4 8%

Table 2.4: Third Party Type and Post-Tenure Fate of Protégé Leaders, 1899-2006
Third Party
USSR/Russia
US
Britain
Syria
China
France
Iran

Before 1990
Not Safe Safe
2
11 (9)
4
12 (5)
0
2 (1)
0
1 (1)
0
1 (1)
0
2 (0)
1
0 (0)

1990-2006
Not Safe Safe
0
7 (4)
0
2 (0)
1
0 (0)
0
1 (1)

Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of cases in which leader was able to stay
in his/her own country vs. go into exile to a different country.
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2.6

Appendix: Game Solution

2.6.1

Pure Strategy

We solve the game using the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) solution concept. The
first insight that is revealed by the model relates to the government’s decision to use
repression. The government’s decision reduces to choosing the strategy that yields the highest
expected payoff. By subgame perfection, the government would repress the protesters at
the final decision node if, and only if, its expected payoff from repressing is at least as
good as from accommodating. Let us denote the government’s belief that the protesters
are strong as b. Then the government’s payoff from choosing to repress can be expressed as
UG (R) = b(−y − r + k) + (1 − b)(1 − r + k) = k − b(y + 1) + 1 − r and the government’s payoff
from choosing to forgo repression is UG (¬R) = 0. Therefore, the government will choose
to repress if UG (R) ≥ UG (¬R), or k − b(y + 1) + 1 − r ≥ 0. Solving for b, we obtain that,
ignoring knife-edge cases, G will repress when:

b<

1−r+k
.
y+1

(2.1)

Note that there exists a range of conditions, for which the government’s decision to use
repression against protesters depends, in large part, on the size of the assistance k provided
by the third party.19 This means that, should it so wish, the third party can single-handedly
induce the government to use repression simply by offering sufficiently large assistance k.
Lemma 1. When b(y + 1) + r > 1, government’s decision to use repression depends solely
on the size of third party assistance k. Government uses repression against protesters, when
the third party assistance k ≥ b(y + 1) + r − 1. When k < b(y + 1) + r − 1, the government
does not use repression.
19

The specific conditions are b(y + 1) + r > 1, which would hold, for example when the government has a
non-zero belief that the protesters are strong, and the cost of repression is relatively high.
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Suppose that k ∗ is the minimum assistance by T that ensures that G uses repression.
There can be at most one such assured repression level in equilibrium. To see that, suppose
that there were more than one. But then the third party could always benefit by switching
to the lower of the possible amounts, i.e., k ∗ is the lower bound on the level of assistance by
the third party in any equilibria, in which the government uses repression. Furthermore, the
third party would only allocate k ∗ if its payoff from an outcome, in which the government
uses repression outweighed its payoff from an outcome, in which the government does not use
repression.
To derive the conditions, under which the third party prefers the outcome, in which
the government uses repression, we denote the third party’s belief that protesters are strong
by a. We further assume that a = b, since neither T or G has any additional information
to enhance their prior beliefs regarding α. Empirically, this assumption is grounded in each
party’s lack of an incentive to withhold relevant information, given their shared preferences
regarding the policy at hand: i.e. the government and the third party have an incentive to
work together and share intelligence regarding the type of the protesters.
The third party’s payoff, conditional on protesters challenging and the government
repressing, is UT (k|R) = 1 − a − k − β I[k > 0]. If the government does not use repression,
the third party obtains the payoff of UT (k|¬R) = 0. As long as UT (k|R) ≥ 0, the third party
prefers that the government use repression and provides assistance k, such that:

max 1 − a − k − β I[k > 0] ≥ 0

(2.2)

k

s.t.

k − b(y + 1) + 1 − r ≥ 0,
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UT (k|R) ≥ 0

This problem has a non-zero binding solution:

k∗ = b(y + 1) + r − 1

(2.3)

s.t. 0 < b(y + 1) + r − 1 ≤ k ≤ 1 − a − β.

The final step is to look at the behavior of the protesters. If government’s strategy is SG = R,
then UW P (C) = −r − k, which is negative for any k, and therefore worse than UW P (¬C) =
0. Hence, weak protesters never challenge in the equilibria, in which the government uses
repression. Therefore, if G observes C, it believes that the protesters are of the Strong type,
or b = 1. Substituting b = a = 1 into the utility of T , we can derive T ’s strategy—the optimal
amount k that would assure that G does not deviate from R:

k∗ = b(y + 1) + r − 1 = y + r

(2.4)

y + r ≤ −β.

(2.5)

s.t.

Now that we know k ∗ , we can evaluate SP ’s utilities to see that SP plays C as long as
USP (C) ≥ USP (¬C), or 1 − 2r − y ≥ 0. The separating equilibrium, EQ1, derived above, can
be summarized as:



SG = R, b = 1; ST = k ∗ = y + r, a = 1; SSP = C; SW P =¬ C;


1 − 2r − y > 0, r + y < −β
The payoffs:
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USP (EQ1) = 1 − 2r − y








UW P (EQ1) = 0







U
(EQ1) = 0
G|SP




UG|W P (EQ1) = 1








UT P |SP (EQ1) = −y − r−β







UT P |W P (EQ1) = 1
Notably, Inequality 2.5 indicates that this equilibrium only exists for marginal third
parties (β < 0, or more specifically β ≤ −r − y) who derive a benefit (e.g., international
reputation for “toughness”) from a repressive outcome.
Lemma 2. A separating equilibrium only exists for marginal third parties, or β < 0.
Next, let us determine whether there exists a pooling equilibrium, such that G always
represses. The pooling equilibrium in which both types of protesters challenge is impossible
(since, as shown above, if G represses, weak protesters do not challenge). Hence, the only
possible pooling equilibrium, given the government represses, is the one in which SP and
W P do not protest. Hence, ignoring the knife-edge cases, the game has the following pooling
equilibrium, EQ2:



SG = R, b =α ; ST = k ∗ = y + r, a =α ; SSP =¬ C; SW P =¬ C


1 − 2r − y < 0, r + y < −β
The payoffs:
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USP (EQ2) = 0







U (EQ2) = 0
WP




UG (EQ2) = 1







UT (EQ2) = 1
We denote this equilibrium as the Deterrence Equilibrium.
Next, consider the situation when G never represses, which happens when a >

1−r+k
y+1

(by Equation 2.1). In that case, T does not provide k. Substituting k ∗ = 0 into (1), we obtain
a>

1−r
,
y+1

which is stable as long as T does not have an incentive to deviate from k ∗ = 0, or

y + r > −β. This gives us another pooling equilibrium, in which G never represses, T provides
assistance of k = 0, and both types of P choose to challenge. This equilibrium satisfies
the definition of PBE, when a = b = α. Then, the game has a second pooling equilibrium, EQ3:



SG =¬ R, b = α; ST = k ∗ = 0, a = α; SSP = C; SW P = C;


α >

1−r
,
1+y

r + y > −β

The payoffs:




USP (EQ3) = 1







UW P (EQ3) = 1



UG (EQ3) = 0







UT P (EQ3) = 0
Finally, PBE solution concept requires that we define strategies and beliefs even for
non-equilibrium paths. The game is structured in such a way that such off-equilibrium
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paths exist for G after some k 6= 0. Since SG = R as long as α <

1−r+k
1+y

∀ k, we define

a = b = 0 ∀ k 6= 0, which implies that SG = R ∀ k 6= 0.
Sequential rationality and the intuitive criterion
Another critical question is whether these PBEs are sequentially rational. The strongest
critique of the notion of the PBE is its possible irrationality from the perspective of the
forward induction (e.g., see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green, et al. 1995). The intuition beyond
this concern is based on that in reality actors take actions sequentially. Hence, if they discover
themselves on an off-equilibrium path, they must act rationally given that they are already
there. However, the ex-ante approach to the derivation of PBEs may lead to the existence
of such off-equilibria strategies (supporting the behavior on the equilibrium path) that are
irrational if the actor happens to find herself off the equilibrium path.
These critiques lead to the development of the literature proposing possible PBE
refinements (Selten 1975, Kohlberg and Mertens 1986, Kohlberg 1990). One of the ways to
capture sequential rationality is imposing the intuitive criterion (for more information see
Cho and Kreps 1987). The idea of this criterion is that no player (the sender) should yield a
higher utility off-path than in the equilibrium while there exists another player (the receiver)
that assigns a zero probability to this off-path strategy.
Do the equilibria in our game survive the IC? In the context of our game, the violation
of the IC would mean that T and G base their actions in the lower part of the game on the
assumption that they respond to the weak type of the protesters. The reason for this is that
the strong type is more likely to end up in the lower part of the game, since there is a larger
parameter space, for which it is rational to contest for the strong type. For any possible
action of T and G, the utility of the strong type is not less than of the weak type. Hence, if
an equilibrium survives the IC, the strategies of T and G must stay rational even it is only
the strong type that contests.
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EQ1 is separating and only the strong type contests, hence the IC does not apply at all.
In EQ2, the game does not reach the lower part of the game graph, and the IC does not apply
as well. Finally, the only equilibrium in that the IC might be potentially violated is EQ3.
Does it happen? No, it does not since the choice of k and, then, whether or not to repress the
protesters is the result of the relation, r + y > β. It is not based on the assumption that the
protesters are weak. Contrary to that, if the protesters are indeed strong given, r + y > β;
even if α = 1 and so are the beliefs, the rational strategies of G and T stay the same and
EQ3 holds.

2.6.2

Mixed Strategy

The game also has a set of semi-separating equilibrium, in which SW P = ¬C, but SP plays
C with a positive probability. First, remember that SW P = ¬C, as long as a = b >

1−r−k
.
1+y

Second, in order to mix C and ¬C, SP must be indifferent between these two strategies, i.e.
G must mix R and ¬R with such a probability that leaves SP indifferent between C and
¬C. More formally, if we denote G’s probability of playing R as γ, then:

γ(1 − r − k) + 1 − γ = 0;

(2.6)

γ(1 − r − k − 1) = −1;
γ=

1
.
r+k

In an equilibrium, condition 2.6 must be consistent with SP ’s strategy. If we denote
SP ’s probability of playing C as w, then:

wα = a
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(2.7)

or

w=

1−r+k
.
α(1 + y)

(2.8)

These strategies must be stable. Since T ’s strategy k is continuous, we define a semiseparating equilibrium for our three-player game as an equilibrium in which T’s strategy
cannot affect the outcome of the game: in that case T will provide k = 0. Hence, in semipooling equilibria, the game effectively reduces to a two-player signaling game between P
and G.
Then, the semi-pooling equilibrium can be summarized as:



1−r

SG = (min ( 1r , 1), 1 − min ( 1r , 1), α = a = b = max ( 1+y
, 0));







S = k ∗ = 0;
T



1−r
1−r

, 0), 1 − max ( α(1+y)
, 0);
SSP = (max ( α(1+y)







SW P = ¬C.

The concept of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) requires that we also define
the strategies for non-equilibrium paths. Since the semi-pooling equilibrium defined above
holds for all k, we assume that if T provides any amount other than k ∗ = 0, the strategies of
the government and the protesters remain the same.
This semi-separating equilibrium allows for two types of observable outcome: (1) when
r > 1, the government represses with a probability 1r , and neither type of protesters challenge
(SSP = SW P = ¬C); and (2) when 0 < r < 1, then the government’s and the third-party’s
believe that the protesters are of the Weak type (a = b = 0), in which case the government
always represses, and the Strong protesters challenge with any probability. Note that the
outcome, in which we observe both protests and repression is not part of the semi-pooling
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equilibrium. Hence, given the parameter restrictions adopted in the current version of the
game, the outcome of observed conflict between the government and the protesters as part of
an equilibrium is only possible in the separating equilibrium (i.e., Removal equilibrium).
Conflict between the government and the protesters is, of course, obtained as apart
of the semi-separating equilibrium in a more general form of the game that relaxes the
assumption that the policy benefit is zero-sum for the three players. Suppose, instead, that
instead of a policy benefit of 1 for each player, the protesters’ policy benefit is mp , the
third party’s policy benefit is mt , and = the government’s policy benefit is mg . Then, the
semi-separating equilibrium may be re-written as:




SG = ( mrp , 1 −







S = k ∗ = 0;

mp
), α
r

=a=b=

mg −r
;
mg +y

T


mg −r


SSP = ( α(m
,1 −


g +y)





SW P = ¬C.

mg −r
);
α(mg +y)

In this more general case, we observe conflict between the government and the protesters
as part of a semi-separating equilibrium, as long as mg > r.

2.6.3

The Special Case of Third-Party with No Interest in the Interaction

The case β = 0 =⇒ k = 0, hence the third-party has no interest in the game and becomes
insignificant. What does the game look like in that case? Then, G plays R given the belief b:
uG (R) = (−y − r)b + (1 − b)(1 − r) ≥ 0 = uG (¬R).
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1. Check for a separating equilibrium, such that SG = R, which requires b <

1−r
,
1+y

which,

in turn implies that SSP = C and SW P = ¬C. However, then b must be 1, hence this
equilibrium is inconsistent and does not exist.
2. Check for a pooling equilibrium, such that SG = ¬R, which requires that b >

1−r
,
1+y

which implies that SSP = C and SW P = C. Since both types of the protesters are
equally likely to protest in this case b = α. Hence, this equilibrium exists if α >

1−r
1+y

3. As shown above, these conditions also allow for a semi-separating equilibrium.

2.7

Appendix: Data

In order to conduct an empirical evaluation of the model’s predictions, we collect original
data on the post-tenure fate of leaders who received overt support from a third-party. We
started with the cases that are likely to result in the separating equilibrium of our game: those
identified by Chenoweth:2011 as (1) characterized by major instances of government repression,
and (2) in which leader received overt third-party support. Cases of foreign occupation during
international wars, such as German occupation during WWII, are excluded, as the third
party is the same as domestic government (e.g., German occupation of Poland). The resulting
dataset consists of 77 cases. The unit of analysis is the protest campaign. Our dataset extends
GoemansGleditschChiozza:2009 dataset, as those do not include leaders whose tenure lasted
less than 3 years. Our data also extend the name of the third party, which is not included in
Chenoweth:2011 dataset.
For each case, we collected information on the following variables:
• Leader —the name of the leader who faced the protesters and was supported by the
third party. If a protest campaign took place during tenure of several leaders, we collect
information on the leader who was in power in the beginning of the protests and can
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thus be directly linked to the issue of protester’s grievance. Most protest campaigns
end or decline in scale within the tenure of a single leader.
• Third Party—the name of the country that operated as the third party;
• Removal —takes on the value of 1 if the leader was removed (as a result of a regular
election, a special election, a coup, a resignation, etc.) as a direct consequence of
protests;
• Fate—post-tenure fate of the leader in the first several years after removal. Fate takes
on the following values:
1. Stayed —leader stayed in their own country;
2. Exile—leader went into exile, “medical treatment,” or moved to a different country
for other reasons;
3. Prison—leader was imprisoned, including cases of house arrest;
4. Execution—leader was executed as a result of a trial;
5. Assassinated —leader was assassinated;
6. Natural Death—leader died a natural death of old age or illness.
The data, along with a brief description of third-party’s role in each case, are presented
in Table 2.5. All the data were collected by two independently-working coders. A small
number of the cases of disagreement between the coders were reviewed/corrected by the
authors.
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(Carothers, 1991, p. 32)

Soviet troops (Granville, 2006) .

Continued on next page

Purchased weapons from the Soviet Union and France (Beevor, 2006, p. 413) .

The US sent USS Tacoma (Knarr, 2012, p. 22) .

human rights abuses (Sheinin, 2010, p. 164) .

US military assistance ended during the Carter administration as a result of

214, 432) .

Both Nixon and Kissinger provided covert assistance (Kornbluh, 2013, pp. 211,

the office, Jimenez fled to Miami (Galván, 2012, p. 69) .

awarded him the Legion of Merit Medal in 1954. After he was removed from

The U.S. had a commercial relationship with Jimenez dictatorship. Eisenhower

suspended economic and military aid (Scranton, 1991) .

Noriega worked closely with the CIA in the beginning of his term. In 1988, US

economic aid is estimated between $300-$500 million.

US military aid peaked in 1984, but decreased to $81.5 million in 1988. US

US economic and military aid (Byrne, 1996, p. 92) .

Involvement of US marines (Daugherty, 2015) .

.

The US sold $1.28 million worth of weapons to Obregon (Gonzales, 2002, p. 200)

The US stationed about 23000 troops (Paul, 2008, p. 15) .

(Leonard, 2004, p. 20) .

Financial, military, and logistical support from the United States government

Evidence of Third-Party Assistance (if available)

Table 2.5: Post-Tenure Fate of Repressive Leaders, 1899–2006
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Zhivkov lost his support from the Soviet Union (Dimitrov, 2013) .
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Start

1987

1989

2001

1989

1991

1991

1991

1989

2003

1967

1966

1996

1974

1976

1978

Country

Romania

Estonia

Ukraine

Belarus

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan

Benin

Liberia

Nigeria

Chad

Uganda

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Ethiopia

1991

1983

1991

2006

1990

1970

2003

1990

1994

1994

1994

1989

2004

1989

1989

End

Front

Liberation

Tigrean

(Ogaden)

rebels

Somali

led rebels

Eritrean-

LRA

Frolinat

Biafrans

LURD

Karabakh

in Nagorno-

Armenians

Karabakh

in Nagorno-

Armenians

& Abkaz

Gamsakurdia

Revolution

Orange

Revolution

Singing

Campaign
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1

Removal

1

0

1

1

Mengistu

Mengistu

Mengistu

Museveni

Malloum

1

1

1

0

Tombalbaye; 1

Gowon

Taylor

Kérékou

Mutallibov 1

Mutallibov 1

Shevardnadze0

Sokolov

Yanukovich 1

Sillari

Ceasescu

Nicolae

Leader

Fate

Third Party

Exile

Exile

Exile

Assass.

Exile

Stayed

Exile

Exile

Stayed

Stayed

Evidence of Third-Party Assistance (if available)

France continued to provide consultation and renewed military aid. Later in the

Soviet

Union

Soviet

Union

Soviet

Union

the Somalian guerrillas and Eritrea (Rule, 1988) .
Continued on next page

treaty with the Soviet Union that increased the level of military aid helped fight

$4 billion in military hardware between 1978-1986, Mengistu signed a 20 year

the Somalian guerrillas and Eritrea (Rule, 1988) .

treaty with the Soviet Union that increased the level of military aid helped fight

$4 billion in military hardware between 1978-1986, Mengistu signed a 20 year

the Somalian guerrillas and Eritrea (Rule, 1988) .

treaty with the Soviet Union that increased the level of military aid helped fight

$4 billion in military hardware between 1978-1986, Mengistu signed a 20 year

10 years (, 2016) .

African
Union

The U.S gave about $750 million of aid annually and trained their military for

US,

et al., 1998, p. 391) .

conflict, France negotiated directly with rebels cutting out Malloum (Ciment

self from economic and political dependence on France, but was not successful.

ria

Military support from France between 1968-1984. Malloum tried to free him-

British army helped repress the protesters (Leapman, 1998) .

Logistical support from the US military (New York Times, 2003) .

Faced with protests, leader abandoned communism.

derhill et al., 2013, p. 127) .

Mutallibov lost Russian support after failing to negotiate an energy deal (Van-

derhill et al., 2013, p. 127) .

Mutallibov lost Russian support after failing to negotiate an energy deal (Van-

A treaty with Russia, Russian military aid (Bohlen, 1994) .

Financial assistance from Russia (Moser, 2014, p. 137) .

(W. C. Thompson, 2012, p. 527) .

Ceasescu tried to play the Soviet Union off of the US and took aid from West

Nige-

France,

Britain

US

Russia

Russia

Russia

Russia

Union

Soviet

Russia

Union

Soviet

Union

executed Soviet
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Start

1975

1979

1974

1953

1962

1983

1977

1979

1959

1961

Country

Angola

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

Morocco

Sudan

Sudan

Iran

Iran

Iraq

Iraq

1975

1959

1996

1979

2005

1973

1956

1980

1992

2001

End

Leader

Stayed

Evidence of Third-Party Assistance (if available)

Cuba

zorena

People’s

pro-

bellion

Kurdish re-

officers

Western

and

Tribe

Shammar

KDPI

Revolution

Iranian

faction

Garang

SPLA-

Anya Nya

War

dence

Indepen-

Moroccan

Union

Qasim

Qasim

jani

Rafsan-

Khamenei;

0

0

0

1

1

Nimeiry

Pahlavi

1

1

Abboud

Aarafa

Exile

Exile

Exile

Soviet
Union,

Mu-

1

Smith;

Zimbabwe
African

Union

Soviet

Union

Soviet

Russia

US

States began selling Sudan equipment around 1976, hoping to counteract Soviet

Iran

(de Lama, 1985)
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Economic and military aid (S. C. Tucker, 2010, p. 622)

Economic and military aid (S. C. Tucker, 2010, p. 622) .

Military aid (San-Akca, 2016, p. 202) .

2014) .

US helped istall Pahlavi in a coup and supported his regime since (Hastedt,

1987. In 1993, Iran started providing financial aid.

second civil war, American assistance dropped, and was eventually cancelled in

and supplied quantities of automatic small arms. After the beginning of the

$101 million. West Germany established an ammunitions factory in Khartoum

support of Marxist Ethiopians and Libyans. Military sales peaked in 1982 at

U.S.-aligned countries resumed supplying Sudan in the mid-1970s. The United

US,

from Britain (Poggo, 2008, p. 165) .

ing civil and combat aircrafts. Sudan also bought armored cars and weapons

Economic and military support from the British: training airforces and supply-

Ibp, 2004, p. 111) .

Spain

Britain

France helped Arafa come to power (International Business Publications and

France,

(Pascoe,

aid to Machel. Third-parties withdrew support after the Cold War
1986) .

US

Chissano

Machel;

U.S. provided $10 million in economic and humanitarian aid as well as military

Renamo
Britain,

construction of Soviet military bases (Abbott, 2011, p. 10)

stroy population centers. Eventually Neto lost Soviet support by refusing the

Cuban troops used flame throwers, bulldozers, and planes with napalm to de-

Joaquim

Cuba

Soviet

Third Party

Union,

0

Fate

Santos

0

Removal

dos

Neto;

France,

UNITA

Campaign
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1969

1982

2005

1962

Lebanon

Lebanon

Yemen

1989

1989

1921

1973

1983

1948

Kyrgyzstan

Mongolia

India

Pakistan

Pakistan

Burma

2006

1983

1977

1922

1990

1989

Nu;

Ne Win

Thaik;

U

Haq

movement

Karens

Zia-ul-

pro-dem

ter)

minis-

Bhutto
(prime

rebels

leaders

Baluchi

Hindi

bellion

Batmönkh

Masaliev

Moplah Re-

Movement

cratic

Demo-

Kyrgyzstan

(UTO)

Army

cratic

Demo-

Popular

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

Britain

Prison

US,

China

Britain,

Arabia

Saudi
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inspectors, but later offered military aid (Hevesi, 1988) .

Carter cut off aid to Pakistan in 1979 after the refusal of international nuclear

The British Government used repression to put down the rebellion.

Batmönkh was against using repression against protesters and resigned (Ellison,
1988) .

(Olson, L. B. Pappas, and

Union

N. C. Pappas, 1994)

Soviet

Soviet support; no specific information available

Union

Support of Russian and Uzbek military forces (Dagiev, 2013, p. 99)

Soviet

executed Iran

Stayed

Stayed

Russia

the number of military advisers (Oberdorfer, 1980) .

1997

Rakhmon

1992

Tajikistan

0

Taraki

The Soviets provided trucks, artillery, tanks and other weapons and increased

Afghans
Union

1979

lion Soviet loan (Abir and Yodfat, 2013, p. 51) .

Arab

Soviet

Egypt had to withdraw aid after 6-day war. Al-Sallal signed a treaty of friend-

ence of 14,000 Syrian troops and intelligence officers (Whitaker, 2013)

Peaceful non-sectarian protests against Syrian involvement, including the pres-

(Salamey, 2013, p. 46) .

President Frangieh asked for a Syrian intervention aid in ending the civil war

(, 1987) .

Egypt,

Syria

Israel

Syria

Evidence of Third-Party Assistance (if available)
Eisenhower sent 5,000 soldiers and marines who stayed in Beirut for six months

1978

Exiled

Stayed

Stayed

US

Third Party

Afghanistan

1

1

0

1

Fate
Stayed

ship and economic and technical coorporation, which, in essence, to a $39 mil-

al-Sallal

Karami
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Israel oc-

Frangieh

1

Removal

Union

Royalists
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Hizballah
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Leader
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Campaign
leftists

Soviet
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Lebanon
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Lebanon

End
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1946

1986

Philippines

1970

Cambodia

1960

1970

Thailand

Philippines

1972

Sri Lanka

Laos

1971

Sri Lanka

1978

1988

Burma

Cambodia

Start

Country

1983

1954

1975

1997

1975

1973

2006

1971

1988

End

Leader

Power

Marcos

Magsaysay

Rebellion
People

Roxas;

Vatthana

Hukbalahap

Pathet Lao

Samrin

Nol

Khmer

Heng;

1

0

1

0

1

Kittikachorn1

Sirisena

madasa;

Pre-

Jayewardene;0

Khmer

Rouge

1

Removal

Bandaranaike0

Lwin

Rouge

rebels

communist

LTTE

JVP

movement
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Campaign
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Exile

Prison

Exile

Exile

Stayed

Fate

US

US

US

US

US

US

dia,Singapore

In-

istan,

Pak-

Union,

Soviet

China

Third Party

Evidence of Third-Party Assistance (if available)

(IBP, 2012)

(IBP, 2012) .

President Ronald Reagan started distancing himself from the Marcos regime

Military and economic aid amounting to U.S. $400 million, but by 1984, U.S.

under the Military Defense Assistance Act.

Congress allocated an undetermined amount of grant aid for the government

Vatthana was the last representative of the royal dynasty.

US aid (Ciment, 2015, p. 533)

Troops (Semple, 1970) .

Massive financial aid (Tarling, 1999, p. 295) .

Military aid (Marks and Singh Brar, 2016) .

Soviet military aid (Patrick, 2006, p. 120) .

175).

and monthly food rations. China provided aid (Chenoweth and Stepan 2011,

with assistance, including guards, a pension, several four-wheel drive vehicles

After over-throwing Lwin in a military coup, the junta nonetheless provided him

Chapter 3
State-controlled Media and Foreign
Policy: Analyzing Russian-language
News
20

3.1

Introduction

State-owned media outlets provide authoritarian regimes with an invaluable resource that
helps frame events and policy decisions. Recent research has evaluated authoritarian regimes’
strategic use of state-owned media to control dissent (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2013) , or
to influence public opinion during political crises (L. Windsor et al., 2017) . We build on
this research to evaluate the state-owned media outlets with the goal of framing military
interventions.
20
Elena Labzina and Mark David Nieman (2017). State-controlled Media and Foreign Policy: Analyzing
Russian-language News
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Authoritarian regimes often employ state-owned media to explain and justify their
domestic and foreign policies. Policy framing, however, is most effective if it is consistent
with the existing conceptions of the state, its place within the larger political structure,
and the pre-established social identities (C. G. Thies and M. D. Nieman; Wendt, 2017;
1994) . State-sponsored media accounts of current events generally are consistent with these
pre-existing narratives. In other words, autocrats often frame their own actions and the
actions of foreign states within a set of familiar tropes, which can often be condensed into
characterizations such as whether the state is a superpower, rising power, regional power, ally,
rival, or some combination.
These tropes help contextualize, justify, and make sense of either the regime’s, or a rival
state’s, foreign policy actions. Lo (2004) , for example, contends that Russian leadership
views itself as a barrier against a barbarian West, while Lavrov (2006) and MacFarlane
(2006) argue that Russia considers itself a great power central to the international order
with a hegemony in the post-Soviet space. From this vantage point, Russian military action
in Eastern Europe fulfills the conflict management obligations of a regional or great power.
These characterizations and attributed identities provide a framework that both clarifies and
constrains the ways in which a government can effectively cast friendly or unfriendly foreign
governments to their population.
The goal of the paper is to investigate the use of state-media to frame militarized
interventions via textual analysis. Advances in textual analysis have created new research
opportunities for systematic analysis of mass media coverage, including manipulation of
coverage for the purposes of furthering specific goals of the political elite.

McManus;

McManus (2014; 2016) and Andrew H. Kydd and McManus (2015) , for example, examine
statements by US presidents to study how leaders signal resolve. Textual analysis has also
been widely used to investigate how closed regimes convey (and sometimes manipulate)
information for both domestic and foreign audiences. Lucas et al. (2016) perform a study of
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leading Muslim clerics’ fatwas to explain variation in Jihadist legal thought. L. C. Windsor,
N. Dowell, and A. Graesser (2014) and N. M. Dowell, L. C. Windsor, and A. C. Graesser
(2015) investigate linguistic patterns of persuasion utilized by authoritarian leaders during
crises.
We use these tools to analyze the Russian government’s use of state-owned media to
frame the public’s perception of issues and events. We argue that, in contrast to independent
media outlets whose coverage is determined by occurrence/salience of events, state-owned
media outlets may be used to shape public response/perception as, or even before, a state
implements a specific policy. We develop a web-scraping application that allows us to extract
and analyze vocabulary structures of both state-owned and independent Russian-language
media. The goal is to explore how the Russian government projects both its self-perceptions
and its perception of “the West” onto its citizens. By focusing on Russian-language sources,
rather than relying on secondary sources or English translations, we directly access government
efforts to frame issues for their domestic audience.
In what follows, we analyze the vocabulary structure of Russia-24, a state-owned news
channel, and Dozhd, an independent news channel, in order to separate event-driven coverage
from state-directed propaganda. We use a change-point model to identify shifts in the nature
of Russian media coverage. We find that Russian state-owned media significantly increased
its coverage of Georgia and Ukraine in the months preceding Russia’s military interventions.
This increase in coverage was often supplemented and associated with an increased focus on
traditional Russian political rivals, such as the US.
In the next section, we discuss how media, and state-owned media in particular, influence
political outcomes. We then develop a foreign policy theory of state behavior and media
framing, and apply this account to the case of Russia. The following section discusses our
data collection technique and displays preliminary evidence. Finally, we describe and present
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the results of our data analysis, and conclude by summarizing the results, implications, and
next steps.

3.2

Media Effects and Political Behavior

There are several accounts of how individuals process information provided be media outlets,
such as Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) (Zaller; Zaller, 1992; 1996) and motivated reasoning
(Redlawsk; Taber and Lodge, 2002; 2006) . Each of these theories expect that individuals
with low politically sophistication may change their attitudes when presented with a counterattitudinal message, whereas politically sophisticated individuals mediate messages that
counter their pre-existing beliefs.21 An alternative account, selective exposure, holds that
individuals selectively choose media sources that fit with their pre-existing views (Iyengar
and Hahn; Iyengar, Hahn, et al., 2009; 2008) .22 Individuals that select like-minded news
are less likely to receive counter-messages that may change or mediate their attitudes, and
when they do they are more likely to show hostility towards the media source (Arceneaux,
Johnson, and Murphy; Vallone, Ross, and Lepper, 2012; 1985) .
State-owned media alters the manner in which individuals can process information
and affect political behavior. Countries with state-owned media substantially raise the costs
of individuals to engage in selective exposure.23 Moreover, the subset of the population
likely to engage in selective exposure is relatively small (Stroud, 2011) . Thus, much of the
population is susceptible to media influences. In the absence of counter-balancing information
and limited options for selective exposure, large segments of the population can be influenced
by a centralized and orchestrated account of policy or events.
21

While RAS expects that counter-attitudinal messages are discounted or even neutralized, conditional
on the the recipient’s level of political sophistication, motivated reasoning permits recipients to attitudes to
change in the opposite direction of the message. See Prior (2013) for a review.
22
Selective exposure may be mitigated by other selection criteria, such as endorsement cues or anxiety
(Messing and Westwood; Valentino et al., 2014; 2009) .
23
As detailed in the next section.
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3.2.1

State-owned Media

Autocratic regimes frequently use media to cement their own political power, even as the media
environment has become more commercial and less centralized since the 1990s. Despite risks
associated with undermining the state capacity to respond to environmental and economic
crises by restricting credible information flows of bureaucratic performance to the central
regime, autocratic regimes are incentivized to restrict media freedom in order to prevent the
public from knowing of policy failures (Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin, 2009) .
In an effort to gain the benefits of information without the risk of fueling discontent,
autocratic regimes frequently attempt to permit some media freedom, within a specific
boundaries, in order to minimize any collective action against the regime (Egorov, Guriev,
and Sonin; Gunitsky; King, Pan, and Roberts, 2009; 2015; 2013) . Rather than directly
managing content via government-scripted stories and pre-publication censorship, autocratic
regimes have increasingly relied on self-censored media to support regime goals (Hassid;
Schimpfossl and Yablokov; Stockmann and M. E. Gallagher, 2008; 2014; 2011)

24

, as well

as providing a higher-quality product on state-owned and state-affiliated media to maintain
viewership (Moehler and Singh; Stockmann and M. E. Gallagher, 2011; 2011) .25 Media
self-censorship relates to the choice, distortion, and emphasis of stories covered (or not
covered) (Lee, 1998) .
Self-censorship arises from one, or a combination, of mechanisms. First, self-censorship
can result from uncertainty regarding what content may result in punishment of journalist
and managers. In the case of China, for instance, reporters temper how aggressively to pursue
stories because they are unsure how far they can push a story without facing harsh and
arbitrary punishment (Hassid, 2008, p. 422) . Second, the government may make clear that
certain topics that are taboo to cover at all. Coverage critical of Vladimir Putin, for instance,
24
25

The threat of coercion, of course, is necessary in order to enforce self-censorship.
Oates (2007) argues that state subsidies offer government’s leverage over media coverage and content.
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is not allowed on state-aligned networks (Schimpfossl and Yablokov, 2014) .26 Finally,
self-censorship can result from journalist responding to a reward structure that avoids raising
content that the government considers problematic. From the perspective of the regime, an
advantage of self-censorship is that each mechanism should apply to nonstate-affiliated media.
These mechanisms produce media coverage that toes the party line. At the same time,
state-owned media are able to take advantage of relatively high programming quality, and
subsequent viewer interest, resulting from reporter creativity.27 Even non-political shows,
but ostensibly entertainment programming, such as legal shows, can be used to push the
government’s agenda (Stockmann and M. E. Gallagher, 2011, pp. 453,456) .28 Independent,
private-owned media, conversely, are often disadvantaged in financing and may have lower
programming quality, on average, than state-owned media outlets (Coyne and Leeson;
Vartanova, 2009; 2012) .
That state-media reflect their government’s positions and policies is important because
the public often has higher or equal levels of trust in state-owned rather than independent
media (Moehler and Singh, 2011) . One implication is that viewing independent media
does not always affect public opinion when it contrasts with state-owned media (Gehlbach
and Sonin; Shi, Lu, and Aldrich, 2014; 2011) . Relatively high trust, combined with the
lack of well-resourced competition, mean that state-owned media can effectively relay the
government’s policy positions to the public.
26
These strategies can serve as substitutes. China has consistently been one of the world’s leaders in
jailing journalist, but seldom executes journalist. Russia, on the other hand, has consistently seen the most
journalists killed (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017) .
27
The existence of multiple state-aligned channels in Russia, for instance, ensures that they must compete,
to some degree, for viewers. Thus, to keep viewer interest, they cannot aim solely at brainwashing, as viewers
will become bored and change the channel (Schimpfossl and Yablokov, 2014, p. 308) .
28
Huang (2015) argues that, in addition to direct attempts to influence public opinion, the constant
presence of government signals strength in effort to maintain political order.
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3.2.2

Foreign Policy and State-owned Media

State-owned media can be used to frame and justify a government’s policy position. Consistent
with China’s increasingly cooperative foreign policy towards the US, the state-owned People’s
Daily was more positive in coverage towards the US than independent media (Stockmann,
2011) . State-owned media can also be used by the government to solidify or coordinate
policy with domestic elites. Gunitsky (2015) argues that mass media, and more recently
social media, is used to coordinate the interests of central and local elites. He notes that
Russia, in particular, has used mass media to central power and limit the authority of local
politicians.
The ability of a regime to project policies onto its population, however, is not absolute. Even with state-owned casting policies in a favorable light, a government faces some
restrictions when presenting formation to the public. For instance, though Chinese labor
law has transitioned from a collective to a market-based system since the economy has been
gradually liberalized since the 1970s, appeals to work rights remain a part of the Communist
government’s ethos. Reforms in Chinese labor law, and the related effect on workplace rights,
are often cast by state-owned and state-affiliated media as a new “rights protections” to
champion the laborer over exploitative employers, even if in practice cases favorable to labor
are often not implemented (Stockmann and M. E. Gallagher, 2011, pp. 444-448) . States,
in other words, are constrained and framed by the messages and identities that a they have
previously invoked.
To account for the constraints imposed by national identities and value systems, we
adopt a foreign policy approach to analyzing state behavior towards its neighbors. Foreign
policy approaches consider both international and domestic features that serve to structure
and constrain the choices available to a government regime (Holsti; C. G. Thies and Breuning,
1970; 2012) . Through interactions with other states, state leaders adopt perceptions of
themselves and assign identities to other states (Breuning; S. G. Walker; Wendt, 2011;
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1992; 1994) . The specific roles/identities that a state assigns to itself—i.e. its national role
conceptions (NRCs)—reflect domestic elite preferences and their expectations of appropriate
state behavior.29 These adopted and assigned identities/roles provide social constraints on a
state’s behavior through limiting the strategies a leader can even conceive of undertaking
(M. D. Nieman; C. G. Thies; C. G. Thies and M. D. Nieman, 2016; 2013; 2017) .
Governments can use state-owned media to describe itself, as well as those states
identified as foreign friends and foes, as part of an effort to generate a well curated and
managed message for the public. Governments use these NRCs to reify their own influence
and to manage how foreign events are perceived domestically. Thus, states have an incentive
to maintain NRCs and frequently use them as a point of reference for making sense of and
understanding unexpected events. By operating within a foreign policy theoretical framework,
we are able to understand how authoritarian regimes can raise the salience and context of
specific issues or interactions with neighboring states within the broader understanding of a
state’s position within the international system. For instance, following the Maidan protests
that resulted in the ouster of Ukraine’s President Yanukovych, the Russian government
described their intervention in Ukraine and support of militant forces in Donetsk and Luhansk
within the broader context of a geopolitical struggle with the US, rather than simply as an
attempt to maintain political control of a traditional ally.
Efforts to unite and control domestic (and sometimes foreign) populations through
normative influence via mass media is a critical component of state sovereignty, and is a
cheaper alternative to state-building and political control than coercion (Warren; Warren,
2014; 2015) . While independent media tend to be event- rather than policy-driven, i.e. their
coverage is driven by event-occurrence and salience, state-owned media outlets may be used
to shape public response/perception, even before a state implements a policy. State-controlled
29
The roles that a state assigns to itself may face some domestic contestation from domestic rivals (Brummer
and C. G. Thies; Cantir and Kaarbo, 2015; 2012) .
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media may thus be used to re-assert identities that a government wants to emphasize. For
instance, governments can justify intervention in neighboring state by invoking the role of
great power, protector of a region or co-ethnics, or a regional or global balancer.30 Mass
communication can also be used to co-opt potential partisans in neighboring states.
As an example, following the 2013–2014 Maidan protests and subsequent departure of
the pro-Russian President Yanukovych from Ukraine, Russian media repeatedly referred to
a region in Ukraine—stretching from Donbass in the East, to Crimea and along the coast
adjacent to the Black Sea in the South, to Transnistria in Moldova—as Novorossiya. In the
aftermath of the Maidan uprising, Russia claimed that Novorossiya was historically a Russian
territory—citing the conquests of Catherine the Great—and referred to the new government
in Kiev as a fascist junta, attempting to invoke geographical and political divisions from
World War II. Such references could potentially be used to provide justification for intervening
in a neighbor in effort to protect co-ethnics, as well as attempt to assert a greater-Russian
identify and generate support from those living in southern and eastern Ukraine who may
view Russian news broadcasts advocating this perspective.31

3.3

Russian Media and Foreign Policy

In this paper, we focus on the Russian government’s use of media in an effort to preemptively
build support for their international conflicts. Contemporary Russia constitutes a suitable
case for our analysis, as the government directly or indirectly controls much of the media
landscape.32 A privately owned independent channel, Dozhd, is a notable exception.
30

While the great power role is well known within the international relations literature ([ [) ]Chibaetal:2014,
the regional and co-ethnic protector (Davis and W. Moore; Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 1997; 2010) and
regional and global balancer (Levy and W. R. Thompson, 2010) roles have also been invoked to explain
conflict behavior.
31
Russian media is popular in many post-Soviet states, as it frequently provides higher quality news and
entertainment programming than domestic offerings (Trenin; Vartanova, 2009; 2012) .
32
Despite the increase in television channels, news coverage is conducted primarily by three national
networks, which are directly controlled by the government (Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014) . Russia’s high
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We argue that governments are constrained in the manner in which they can portray
both themselves and others depending on pre-existing NRCs. Governments can manufacture
support in the buildup to potential international conflicts by framing the coverage of the
target. Thus, we expect to see an increase in the number of new stories about a target prior
to military intervention. In the case of regional or rising powers, such as Russia, constructing
support for potential conflict abroad can be relatively easy, if prior NRCs have emphasized
an explicit sphere of influence or a security complex. Governments can simultaneously build
nationalist sentiment and direct this energy against target states. Governments can direct
state-owned media to cover issues and run stories on target states to raise the salience of
these states and magnify grievances with them.
To remain consistent with a state’s NRCs, governments can invoke similarities between
the target of their aggression and other enemies of the state, such as other traditional rival
powers. This can be done by stating that a target is in danger of potentially moving under
the influence of a traditional rival. Doing so can help reduce domestic aversion to the use
of force against co-ethnics. As we demonstrate, state-owned Russian media does precisely
this in the months prior to intervening in Georgia and Ukraine by increasingly referencing
traditional rivals, such as the US.
Russian NRCs, under President Putin, have emphasized the roles of a regional power,
an independent great power, and an aspirant global power (Allison; Lo; Trenin, 2008; 2002;
2009) .33 The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasion
Economic Union (EEU) have even been described as evidence of neoimperial or hegemonic
role in the post-Soviet space on the part of Russia (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll; Rahr,
degree of media control is consistent with theories of information communication and resource allocation ([
[) ]Egorovetal:2009.
33
MacFarlane (2006) suggests that Russia, rather than being an emerging power, seeks to reverse its
decline and return to great power status.
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2010; 2007) . In addition, since at least 2006, the Russian government has once again viewed
the US as its primary geopolitical rival (Rahr, 2007) .
Given these NRCs, one would expect Russia to have an interventionist foreign policy
towards neighboring states (C. G. Thies and M. D. Nieman, 2017) . Russia is directly or
indirectly involved in a number of outstanding disputes: the status of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia with Georgia, the annexation of Crimea with Ukraine, the status of Transnistria
with Moldova, a border dispute with Estonia, and possession of the Southern Kurils with
Japan. Russia has also expressed concern about the welfare of Russian-speaking populations
in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine. Russia has been invited to send troops
to help defend a neighbor’s territorial integrity in the cases of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
(Gibler and Sewell, 2006) . Lastly, Russia has also been involved in managing the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan and, more recently, in Syria.
To justify such an interventionist foreign policy, Russia has framed many of these
disputes and actions as part of a larger conflict between itself and the US. NATO expansion,
for example, has been argued to serve a destabilizing influence on Russia, especially as Russia
is increasingly dissatisfied with its global status and faces economic difficulties (Gibler, 1999)
. It is therefore unsurprising that Russia viewed and framed the conflict with Georgia within
the broader context of US efforts to undermine Russia’s great power status by its involvement
in the colored revolutions and NATO expansion (Tsygankov and Tarver-Wahlquist, 2009) .
Similarly, Russian officials accused the US of aiding and orchestrating the Maidan protests,
and used this claim to justify potential intervention in the crisis (Higgins and Baker, 2014) .
We focus our analysis on a time series of Russian media coverage of Ukraine (and, more
specifically, Crimea) and Georgia. We select these cases because of our focus on changes in
Russian state-owned media coverage. Both the Ukrainian and Georgian cases experience
interventions in the time series of Russian news coverage in the form of Russian military
involvement. Russian interference in Ukraine began with the appearance of “little green men”
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on 27 February 2014. After initial denials, Russian President Putin admitted that the forces
were, in fact, Russian troops (S. Walker, 2015) . This military intervention culminated
in the formal annexation of Crimea by Russia on 18 March 2014. In addition, Russian
military “tourists” entered Eastern Ukraine in March 2014 (S. Walker, 2015) . In the case
of Georgia, Russia sent military forces into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two breakaway
regions supported by Russia, on 8 August 2008 and 9 August 2008, respectively. From a
methodological perspective, these interventions indicate that there are periods of stability in
the relations of both the Ukrainian and Georgian governments and Russia, punctuated by
significant animosity. The interventions may lead to variation in Russian media coverage of
each neighboring state.
To summarize, we expect to observe increasing new stories involving both the target
of Russian aggression, as well as its traditional rivals, by state-owned media prior to the
onset of military intervention. In contrast, independent media is more events-driven and
fluctuation in coverage should coincide more directly with events on the ground. In particular,
increases in state-owned media coverage should precede the Russian military interventions in
Crimea on 27 February 2014 and Eastern Ukraine in March 2014. We also expect increases
in media coverage prior to the Russian intervention into Georgia on 8 August 2008. These
expectations lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Ukraine and Georgia will feature more frequently in Russian state-owned
news stories prior to military intervention.
Hypothesis 2: The US will feature more frequently in Russian state-owned news stories
prior to Russian intervention in Ukraine and Georgia.
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3.4

Analyzing Russian Media

We focus on Russian-language state-owned media outlets to analyze the Russian government’s
manipulation of news coverage aimed at maintaining consistency with pre-existing NRCs.
By analyzing primary sources in their native language, we can assess the impact of Russian
media coverage more directly than if we relied on secondary sources compiled by academics,
or English-language state-owned media, such as Russia Today. Secondary sources may reflect
ex post rationalizations or critiques in light of subsequent events, while English-language
outlets may present an account intended for foreign, rather than domestic, audiences.
We analyze Russian media texts using a supervised learning method (Grimmer and
Stewart, 2013) . We count the frequency of key words in news headlines to identify the
salience of that subject (Hopkins and King, 2010) .34 We assume that the more frequently a
key word appears in the headlines of state-owned media, the more salient the government
wants the topic to be to the public.
Our corpus of interest are new headlines from Russian media websites. The frequency
analysis of the proper names in the headlines of the Russian news channels is based on
two sources. The first one is the key state-controlled Russia-24. Russia-24, formerly Vesti1
(“news” in Russian), is a state-owned news channel. Russia-24 promotes the official position
of the Russian government and serves as one of the Kremlin’s propaganda devices that serves
to shape the public opinion. Though banned in Ukraine, Moldova, and Latvia, the network is
popular among Russian-speaking minorities in several neighboring formerly Soviet republics.
The second source is the independent private Russian channel Dozhd (“Rain” in Russian).
As an independent media outlet, Dozhd is not privileged to private government information.
Thus Dozhd provides purely events-driven news coverage and functions as a placebo to the
state-owned news coverage in our analyzes.
34

Hopkins and King (2010) note that observing counts of key words have consistently been sufficient to
extract substantively meaningful features of texts ([ [) 273]GrimmerStewart:2013.
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We collected the data with a specifically developed web-application that scraped all
news headlines from the news archives available on the web pages of Russia-24.35 When
developing this application, we first identified the HTML-tags referring to the main headlines
in the source code of the web pages. Next, the application collected all headlines going
back as far temporally as data are available. The application then performed a stemming
procedure to identify personal and geographical names: first, we eliminated all non-proper
names. Then, we taught our application to treat all inflections of the same proper name
as the same word. This was important as the Russian language has a highly inflectional
morphology: for example, the inflections of Москва – Москве, Москвы, Москвой, Москву
– are translated as the same word Moscow (noun) in English. For the case of the adjective
meaning of Moscow, the inflections of московский – московского, московским, московскому,
московская, московской, московское, московские, московскими, московских.
We examine a total of 585,615 headlines from Russia-24 for the period 1 January 2006
to 30 April 2016 (4,355,263 words). We review a total of 116,895 headlines from Dozhd
between 24 February 2011 to 20 September 2016 (1,048,362 words). Data were collected at
the daily level, but we aggregate the word counts to the monthly level for our analysis in
order to include other covariates.

3.4.1

Changes in Russian News Coverage

We begin with a preliminary examination of the raw data. Figure 3.1 displays the top ten
topics (proper names) present in Russia-24 headlines from 1 January 2006 to 30 April 2016.
The two most common words, unsurprisingly, are Russia (light blue) and Moscow (orange),
with Putin also featuring prominently. More interestingly, the use of the third most popular
word, Ukraine, significantly changes in frequency during the period under review. It increases
dramatically in the winter of 2014 during the Maidan protests before gradually declining in
35

Russia-24: http://www.vesti.ru/news/ and Dozhd: https://tvrain.ru/news/.
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Figure 3.1: Word Frequencies–Top 10 from Russia-24

Note: The blue vertical line indicates the start of Maidan and the
red vertical line the annexation of Crimea.

2015. Other notable topics include states with a sometimes adversarial role, such as the US
and the EU.
Figure 3.2 focuses on frequencies of the use of the words Ukraine, Kiev, and Crimea.
We focus on Ukraine and Kiev, as the the frequency of these words may be expected to
increase in response to the Maidan protests, given Russia’s long-standing interest in, and
proximity to, Ukraine. We focus on Crimea because it was occupied and annexed by Russia.
Examining the frequency of these specific words also let us compare media focus on unexpected
compared to expected events. The Maidan protests and the eventual overthrow of the proRussian Yanukovych regime, for example, would qualify as unexpected events, as the Russian
government had no hand encouraging either event. The invasion of Crimea, on the other
hand, is an expected event, as a military invasion requires premeditation on the part of the
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Figure 3.2: Word Frequencies–Ukraine from Russia-24

Note: The blue vertical line indicates the start of Maidan and the
red vertical line the annexation of Crimea.

government. In contrasted to unexpected events, state-owned media coverage may presage
expected events, as the government attempts to preemptively frame how the public will
respond.
A preliminary analysis of the data reveals that frequencies of Ukraine and Kiev increase
at the same time as the start and continuation of the Maidan protests, as would be expected
with news coverage of unexpected events. Frequencies of Crimea, on the other hand, begin to
dramatically increase in February, the month prior to the bulk of the Russian invasion and
two months prior to the formal acknowledgment of Russian forces and subsequent annexation.
Frequencies of the US and EU also increase at this time.
As a point of comparison, Figure 3.3 displays the word frequencies for Ukraine, Kiev,
and Crimea from Dozhd. Frequencies of Ukraine and Kiev increase with events in Maidan
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Figure 3.3: Word Frequencies–Ukraine from Dozhd.

Note: The blue vertical line indicates the start of Maidan and the
red vertical line the annexation of Crimea.

and the removal of the Yanukovych regime. Frequencies of Ukraine, Kiev, and Crimea all
peak in March, reflecting the timing of actual events in the conflict.
These results provide initial support for our theoretical expectation. Yet, a simple
time series counting the frequency of our key words does not tell us if their observation is
systematic or if other factors can explained by other factors. The counts could result, for
example, from events-driven coverage, rather than government-directed coverage. In the
next section, we systematically analyze the data using a change-point model to identify
sudden changes in its underlying data generating process. In order to separate event-driven
coverage from government-directed coverage, we control for Dohzd, an independent news
source, when estimating counts of the frequency of key words. By controlling for event-driven
news coverage, we are able to identify when state-owned media begin to focus on specific
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topics. We expect that state-owned media will increase coverage their coverage of the targets
of Russian aggression prior to the onset of military action, as the government attempts to
rally support and justify its behavior.

3.5

Data Analysis

In contrast to events-driven coverage of independent media, we expect that the Russian
government increases state-owned media coverage of target states prior to military intervention.
We also expect that state-owned media increases its coverage, and hence the salience, of
auxiliary issues—such as as its rivalry with the US—to frame the imminent militarized conflict
within the structure of existing NRCs.
In order to identify sudden changes in the structure of the data, we employ an endogenous
Baysian Markov chain Monte Carlo Poisson Change-point model (Chib; Park, 1998; 2010) .36
The estimator is appropriate because (1) our variable of interest is a count of the frequency
of our key words in a given month and (2) it is designed to identify structural breaks in the
underlying data generating process of the frequency of word counts. A change-point model is
a type of time series model where estimates are generated from multiple temporal regimes
(or states) and the primary quantities of interest are the number and timing of changes
in temporal regimes (Martin, Quinn, and Park, 2011) . In other words, the goal of the
change-point model is to identify the optimal number of sub-periods within a time series, and
estimate parameters within each sub-period. One benefit of the Bayesian change-point model
is that, in addition to identifying sub-periods, it provides measures of uncertainty regarding
36

Change-point models have previously been used to identify time-dependent effects for predictors of
militarized conflict (M. D. Nieman; Park; C. G. Thies and M. D. Nieman, 2016; 2010; 2017) .
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their specific timing, i.e. are the sub-periods distinct or do they gradually change from one
sub-period to the next.37
Identifying the timing of change-points allows us to evaluate our first hypothesis concerning changes in the number of stories about a target prior to Russian military intervention.
Parameters on covariates are estimated within each of these temporal regimes and are free to
vary in both effect and direction between them.38 Examining the effect of there covariates
allows us to assess our second hypothesis concerning whether mentions of the US are associated with increases in the number of stories of a target state during a temporal regime in
which a militarized conflict occurred.
The estimator is a Markov model with hidden states and restricted transition properties
(Chib; Chib, 1996; 1998) . Changes from latent states follow a first-order Markov process:
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where pi,j = Pr(st = j|st−1 = i) is the probability of moving to regime j at time t given that
the regime at time t − 1 is i and m is the number of change-points. We specify our Bayesian
Poisson change-point model as
yt ∼ Poisson (λt ) , t = 1, . . . , T
λ ∼ x0t βm , m = 1, . . . , M
37

Parameter estimates are drawn from the posterior distribution of the full state space, which accounts for
the precision (or imprecision) of the estimated change-points on the Poisson parameter estimates (M. D.
Nieman; Park, 2016; 2010) .
38
The posterior sampling distribution of a Poisson with covariates does not adhere to a known conditional
distribution. Fruhwirth-Schnatter and Wagner (2006) develop a technique taking the logarithm of time
between successive events to transform the Poisson regression into a linear regression with log exponential (1)
error.
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and assume priors for the parameter estimates for the Poisson and for temporal regime
transitions of
βm ∼ N (0, 10), m = 1, . . . , M
pij ∼ Beta (α, β) , m = 1, . . . , M
To recover estimates for the model, we run 20,000 MCMCs, after discarding a burnin of
10,000 MCMCs.
We use Bayes Factor to assess model fit and identify the optimal number of changepoints (Chib; Park, 1996; 2010) . Bayes Factor compares two models, treating one as the
baseline model and the other as an alternative model. That is, BFij =

m(y|Mi )
m(y|Mj )

where Mi is

the baseline model, Mj is the alternative model, m(y|Mi ) is the marginal likelihood under
Mi , m(y|Mj ) is the marginal likelihood under Mj . Taking the log of the Bayes Factor,
negative values are interpreted as evidence against the baseline model and positive values are
evidence in favor of the baseline (Gill, 2009, p. 209) .39
Finally, we include several other variables in the model that may influence the frequency
of our variables of interest and that may affect the timing of a structural break. We include
counts of the frequency of US and EU in the Poisson model. We also include the level of
inflation that Russia experiences in a month, as this the state of the economy may encourage
diversionary stories from the state-owned media. Monthly inflation data are obtained from
the OECD (2016) . When appropriate, we include a control variable for the period including
the Maidan protests. This accounts of the instantaneous effect of the protests. Any long-term
effects will be captured by a structural break leading to a new temporal regime. Lastly,
in both the Ukraine and Crimea time series, we include a control variable accounting for
39

Kass and Raftery (1995) provide additional guidelines for interpreting Bayes Factor comparisons; values
between 3-20 offer some support for the baseline model while values >20 provide strong support for the
baseline model.
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observations of the dependent variable from the independent media outlet Dozhd.40 The
inclusion of this variable explicitly separate ‘events on the ground’ from propaganda, in that
independent media can only report what is observable while not being privy to government
plans. This variable cannot be included in the Georgian time series, however, as the Dozhd
data are not available at the time of Russian military intervention.

3.6

Empirical Results

We analyze three different dependent variables: the frequency of Ukraine, the frequency of
Crimea, and the frequency of Georgia in Russia-24 headlines. We use a Poisson change-point
model to identify when there is structural change in the frequency of our dependent variable.
In each case, we begin by using Bayes Factor to identify the number of change-points that
best fit the data. Next, we visualize the posterior density for any identified temporal regimes,
as well as posterior probability density of a change-point in a given year, to identify the
timing of structural breaks. Lastly, we report summaries of the posterior parameter estimates
for each endogenous variable within each identified temporal regime.

3.6.1

Ukraine

We begin by identifying the optimal number of change-points/temporal regimes present in
the data. We do this using Bayes Factor to compare the marginal likelihood across models
with m change-points. These results are reported in Table 3.1. They indicate that M1 has
the best model fit.41 We now focus on the results from this model.
40

As Dozhd has a larger number of total headlines on a monthly basis, we include the dependent variable as
a proportion of all headline words. An advantage of this approach is that it eases calculations of the marginal
likelihood. Parameter estimates are similar regardless of whether the count or proportion measure is used.
The correlation of proportion and count measures are greater than r = 0.9 for Ukraine and Crimea for both
Russia-24 and Dozhd.
41
The results from the Bayes Factor suggest that M1 and M2 are difficult to separate. Both M1 and M2 ,
however, identify a change-point in February 2014 and provide nearly identical parameter estimates for the
post-February time regime. See appendix for these results.
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Table 3.1: Bayes Factor Comparison of Poisson Change-point Models for
Frequency of Ukraine in Russia-24 Headlines.
Log(Bayes Factor)
M0
M1
M2
M3
M4

M0
M1
M2
M3
M4
0 -1833.35 -1832.71 -455.20
-418.8
1833.35
0.00
0.64 1378.10 1414.53
1833.35
-0.64
0.00 1377.46 1413.89
455.20 -1378.10 -1377.46
0.00
36.40
418.8 -1414.53 -1413.89
-36.40
0.00



m(y|Mi )
Note: log BFij = m(y|M
where BFij is the Bayes Factor comparing model
j)
Mi to model Mj Columns are Mi and rows are Mj .

Figure 3.4: Identifying Change-points in the Frequency of Ukraine in Russia-24 Headlines.

Change-point in February 2014. Local means: 38.1, 236.4.

Figure 3.4 presents the posterior density for the three temporal regimes, as well as
posterior probability density of the change-point in a given year. Figure 3.4 identifies a
change-point in February 2014. The results indicate that there is a structural break in the data
between January and February 2014. This structural break suggests that the determinants
of how frequently Ukraine appeared in news headlines changed. Figure 3.4 also indicates
that this break occurred quite sharply. The local means between the temporal regimes
increase dramatically (38.1 compared to 236.4). A change-point at this location, along with
an increase in the frequencies of Ukraine appearing in the headlines, is consistent with our
expectations expressed in hypothesis 1, that Russian state-owned news stories feature target
states more frequently prior to military intervention. In other words, Russian state-owned
media increased their news coverage before their military intervention occurred.
Lastly, Table 3.2 displays the summaries of the posterior distribution for each estimate
associated with the covariates. Of primary interest is the regime following the February 2014
change-point—the second temporal regime. The coefficient on US is positive and significant
at traditional levels, after being negative in the first temporal regime. It is worth noting
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Table 3.2: Parameter Estimates from
Poisson Change-point Model for Frequency of Ukraine in Russia-24 Headlines.

Variable
Mean/SD
Count US
Count EU
Inflation
Maidan
Dozhd
Constant

Feb 2011–
Feb 2014
Mean/SD

Feb 2014–
Apr 2016
Mean/SD

-0.0027
0.0009
-0.0008
0.0012
-0.0318
0.0181
1.0338
0.0725
0.5309
3.1904
4.1726
0.1954

0.0008
0.0004
0.0002
0.0006
-0.0227
0.0040
-0.1019
0.0672
36.8044
2.5092
5.3283
0.1023

Note: Mean and standard deviation estimates drawn from the posterior distribution. 20,000 MCMC were run after
discarding a 10,000 burnin. Parameter estimates of the posterior sample from the
full state space, accounting for the precision (or imprecision) of the estimated
change-points.

that these results hold after accounting for expected media coverage related to the events
taking place in a neighboring state (via the independent news Dozhd variable). Overall, these
results offer support for hypothesis 2, which expected that stories featuring the US would be
associated with increases in headlines of Ukraine.
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Table 3.3: Bayes Factor Comparison of Poisson Change-point Models for
Frequency of Crimea in Russia-24 Headlines.
Log(Bayes Factor)
M0
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5

M0
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
0 -1282.0 -1749.7 -1894 -1608.6 -1652.1
1282.0
0 -467.6 -612.0 -326.6 -370.1
1749.7
467.6
0.0 -144.2
141.1
97.6
1894.0
612.0
144.2
0.0
285.3
241.8
1608.6
326.6 -141.1 -285.3
0.0
-43.5
1652.1
370.1
-97.6 -241.8
43.5
0.0



m(y|Mi )
Note: log BFij = m(y|M
is the Bayes Factor comparing model Mi to model Mj
j)
Columns are Mi and rows are Mj .

3.6.2

Crimea

Next, we turn our analysis to exploring changes in the frequency of observing Crimea in
Russian news headlines. We use Bayes Factor to identify the change-point model with the
best fit. Table 3.3 reports the model comparisons and indicates that M3 has the best model
fit to the data.
Figure 3.5 presents the posterior density for the four temporal regimes and the posterior
probability density of the three change-points. Change-points are identified in April 2012,
February 2014, and November 2015. The structural break in February 2014, the increase
in local means between the second and third temporal regimes (10.5 and 68.8), and the
sharpness of the break, is consistent with hypothesis 1. That is, there appears to be evidence
that Russian state-owned news began to feature stories about Crimea in the lead up to
military intervention.
Finally, Table 3.4 displays the summaries of the posterior distribution for each covariate.
Our focus is on the third temporal regime, which follows the February 2014 change-point.
The coefficient on US is positive and significant at traditional levels, after being negative in
the previous temporal regime. The results control for the expected media coverage from an
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Figure 3.5: Identifying Change-points in the Frequency of Crimea in Russia-24 Headlines.
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independent outlet (via the Dozhd variable). The results are consistent with those which
focused on Ukraine, and again offer support for hypothesis 2.

3.6.3

Georgia

In our last set of analyses, we focus on changes in the frequency of observing Georgia in
Russian news headlines. We identify the change-point model with the best fit using Bayes
Factor. Table 3.5 reports the model comparisons and indicates that M2 has the best model
fit to the data.
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Table 3.4: Parameter Estimates from Poisson Change-point
Model for Frequency of Crimea in Russia-24 Headlines.

Variable
Mean/SD
Count US
Count EU
Inflation
Dozhd
Constant

Feb 2011–
Apr 2012
Mean/SD
-0.0135
0.0145
-0.0388
0.0155
-0.1708
0.1857
0.0100
3.1584
6.0511
2.4156

Apr 2012– Feb 2014–
Feb 2014 Nov 2015
Mean/SD Mean/SD
-0.0205
0.0059
0.0597
0.0074
0.2091
0.3243
0.3423
3.1670
0.4909
1.5503

0.0208
0.0010
0.0086
0.0014
-0.0778
0.0088
6.2267
3.0878
-0.0513
0.2649

Nov 2015
Apr 2016
Mean/SD
0.0052
0.0017
0.0078
0.0042
0.2119
0.0252
-0.0127
3.1597
0.2853
0.6348

Note: Mean and standard deviation estimates drawn from the posterior distribution. 20,000 MCMC were run after discarding a 10,000
burnin. Parameter estimates of the posterior sample the full state
space, accounting for the precision (or imprecision) of the estimated
change-points.

Table 3.5: Bayes Factor Comparison of Poisson Changepoint Models for Frequency of Georgia in Russia-24
Headlines.
Log(Bayes Factor)
M0
M1
M2
M3

M0
M1
M2
0.0 -387.1 -465.0
387.1
0.0 -77.9
465.0
77.9
0.0
416.4
29.2 -48.7

M3
-416.4
-29.2
48.7
0.0



m(y|Mi )
Note: log BFij = m(y|M
where BFij is the Bayes Factor
)
j
comparing model Mi to model Mj Columns are Mi and
rows are Mj .

Figure 3.6 presents the posterior density for the three temporal regimes and the posterior
probability density of the two change-points. Change-points are identified in Aug 2008 and
Nov 2008. The structural break in August 2014 is the same month as Russia’s intervention.
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Figure 3.6: Identifying Change-points in the Frequency of Georgia in Russia-24 Headlines.
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The increase in local means, from 33.5 to 183.3, and the probability of the break, with a 30%
chance that it occurred in July, indicating that increases in Russian news coverage began in
mid to late July, is consistent with hypothesis 1. That is, there appears to be evidence that
Russian state-owned news began to feature stories about Georgia prior to the military crisis
and intervention in the break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Finally, Table 3.6 displays the summaries of the posterior distribution for each covariate.
Our focus is on the second temporal regime, which follows the August 2008 change-point.
The coefficient on US is positive and significant at traditional levels, after exerting a negative
effect during the previous temporal regime. These results again offer support for hypothesis 2.
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Table 3.6: Parameter Estimates from Poisson
Change-point Model for Frequency of Georgia in
Russia-24 Headlines.

Variable
Count US
Count EU
Inflation
Constant

Jan 2006– Aug 2008– Nov 2008–
Aug 2008
Nov 2008
Feb 2014
Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD
-0.0027
0.0214
-0.0018
0.0018
0.0126
0.0008
0.0112
-0.0899
-0.0125
0.0036
0.0214
0.0013
0.2065
0.5071
0.0629
0.0197
0.3704
0.0096
1.2195
-2.8420
3.1620
0.1744
4.3175
0.1446

Note: Mean and standard deviation estimates drawn
from the posterior distribution. 20,000 MCMC were run
after discarding a 10,000 burnin. Parameter estimates of
the posterior sample the full state space, accounting for
the precision (or imprecision) of the estimated changepoints.

3.7

Conclusion

We argue that authoritarian governments use media to build support in the lead up to foreign
intervention, beyond what events-driven coverage would entail. Further, we contend that
state-owned media will add context to this by linking target states to other, traditional
enemies. We develop a web-scraping application to investigate and analyze Russian-languange
media coverage using textual analysis (over 700,000 news stories) of Ukraine and Georgia
from 1 January 2006 to 30 April 2016. We analyze this data for changes in news coverage
using an endogenous Bayesian MCMC Poisson change-point model.
We find evidence that Russian state-owned media does initiate coverage of targets in
the months preceding military interventions. Specifically, we find that Russian state-owned
media increased the number of headlines with Ukraine and Crimea prior to the onset of
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the March 2014 military invasion of Crimea. We also find that Russian state-owned media
increased coverage of Georgia before the August 2008 military invasions in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. In both cases, state-owned media coverage intensified prior to the onset of
actual fighting; this is in contrast to the events-driven coverage from independent media,
which increased at the same time as military intervention. Further, there also evidence that
Russian state-owned media is more likely to discuss target states as it invokes a traditional
rival, the US. These findings are consistent with our expectations. The results indicate that
the Russian government directs state-owned media to manufacture support for its foreign
military adventures. In addition, it frames these conflicts in a manner consistent with a
pre-conceived national roles; namely, as part of a broader geopolitical struggle with the US.
Our analysis contributes the growing literature on foreign policy approaches and role
theory by analyzing primary data sources to evaluate hypotheses about a state’s national role
conceptions. More broadly, our approach offers an innovate way to gather and analyze data
from authoritarian regimes. State-owned media can be used to formulate and test prediction
about foreign and domestic identities of these states. Future research can refine these tools to
zero in on specific policy areas and other authoritarian regimes. For example, while we focus
on Russian-language media outlets to explore the effects of state-owned media on domestic
audiences, one could analyze English-language media outlets to compare differences in issue
salience between intended domestic and foreign audiences.
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3.8

Appendix—Ukraine: 2 Change-points

Table 3.1 could not definitively say that M1 is more likely than M2 (Kass and Raftery,
1995) . We report the results from M2 below.
Figure 3.7 presents the posterior density for the three temporal regimes, as well as
posterior probability density of the change-point in a given year. Figure 3.4 identifies
change-points in January 2013 and February 2014. Consistent with the previous results
(i.e. Figure 3.4), these results indicate that there is a structural break in the data between
January and February 2014. Figure 3.7 also indicates that this break occurred sharply. The
local means between the temporal regimes increase dramatically (39.5 compared to 236.4).
This change-point and the increase in local means is again consistent with our expectations
expressed in hypothesis 1, that Russian state-owned news stories feature target states more
frequently prior to military intervention.
Table 3.7 displays the summaries of the posterior distribution for each covariate. Focusing on the third temporal regime—February 2014 to April 2016—it is clear that the coefficient
on US is positive and significant at traditional levels. US is also significant in the second
temporal regime—January 2013 to February 2014—suggesting that increasing coverage of
the US by Russian state-owned media was associated with increasing coverage of Ukraine
during the final year of Yanukovych’s government.
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Figure 3.7: Identifying Change-points in the Frequency of Ukraine in Russia-24 Headlines.
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Table 3.7: Parameter Estimates from Poisson
Change-point Model for Frequency of Ukraine in
Russia-24 Headlines.

Variable
Count US
Count EU
Inflation
Maidan
Dozhd
Constant

Feb 2011– Jan 2013– Feb 2014–
Jan 2013 Feb 2014 Apr 2016
Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD
-0.0006
0.0052
0.0008
0.0015
0.0024
0.0004
-0.0028
0.0086
0.0002
0.0013
0.0050
0.0006
-0.0185
-0.2525
-0.0227
0.0180
0.1411
0.0040
-0.0118
1.3483
-0.1002
3.1659
0.1410
0.0675
0.1202
0.2458
36.84861
3.184
3.1636
2.5235
4.0084
3.3791
5.3286
0.2288
1.1181
0.1013

Note: Mean and standard deviation estimates drawn
from the posterior distribution. 20,000 MCMC were run
after discarding a 10,000 burnin. Parameter estimates of
the posterior sample the full state space, accounting for
the precision (or imprecision) of the estimated changepoints.
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Chapter 4
Political Astroturfing on Wikipedia as
an ideological manifestation
4.1

Introduction

On October 17, 2017, the journalists released a new investigation about the foreign political
trolls’ efforts to influence US politics (Meduza, 2017) . They argue that an organised group of
online hackers associated with Russia not only influenced the American presidential elections
in 2016, but also significantly contributed to the organization of civil unrest in Charlottesville
in August 2017. Furthermore, a year ago, during the presidential debate on September
26, 2016, the topic of cyber security was already one of the core focuses of the candidates’
conversation (Blake, 2016) . Clearly, the importance of the cyber aspect of the political
processes and conflicts has recently become as important as probably it had never before.
The control over the spread of the information is a vital component in the modern “cyber
wars”. In this new reality, regimes have to master new ways to deliver their messages to the
public in the context of the newly emerged universe of the fluid social media.
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This paper looks at a particular form of media campaigns – online political astroturfing.
In particular, this research focuses at the Internet campaigns performed by a government
in order to influence public opinion. It is organized by hiring individuals or programming
bots who can mimic regular users that comment on social media or public opinion networks
(Keller et al., 2017) . While being a prominent factor of today’s political online discourse,
political astroturfing is vastly under-investigated. In particular, one perspective completely
overlooked so far is whether and how major powers manifest their ideology. Especially, the
paper is interested in how regimes perceive their self-assigned specific roles and identities.
This approach likely captures the social and psychological motivations of the regimes that
may be completely neglected in the rational analysis based on power incentives that are
projected in current events. As C. S. Thies and M. Nieman (2017) state in their volume,
“(self-perceived) role conceptions ... refer to the expectations about a role held by a country
(or at least its leaders)”. Often these “self-expectations” are far less than obvious. So why are
they important to understand? One main reason is that the ideology manifested through the
self-perceived identity greatly influences the outcomes of a country’s foreign policy, hence they
have direct polical and diplomatic implications. This work argues that political astroturfing
may carry an essential and unexpected element of ideology and, hence, provides a potential
fruitful source for the study.
While many researchers (Hegelich and Janetzko; Sanovich, Stukal, and J. A. Tucker,
2016; 2017) study bot online users, this paper is primarily interested in the human contributors to the astroturfing campaign. In the case of the human contributors, political
astroturfing imposes considerable difficulties in terms of investigation and research because of
the identification obstacles that make it challenging to differentiate between false and genuine
regime supporters. To overcome this challenge, this work further proposes a novel strategy
that would employ the available geographical information to investigate the behavior of the
political trolls
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The paper argues that the salient and ever-changing nature of political discourse can
translate to a historical salience of reality. This is a critical implication in terms of the
agenda-based perception formation of the general public as well as the role of political
trolls in perpetuating it. As Labzina and M. Nieman (2017) show, autocratic regimes
portray themselves and others based on their pre-existing self-perceptions with the aid of
the state-controlled media. They emphasize that regimes may use controlled media to raise
political salience and awareness in the desired direction. This paper argues that political
astroturfing can likewise be viewed as a political message placing Labzina and Neiman’s
argument in more general perspective.
As the case of the analysis, this study focuses on Russia. The reason for choosing
this country is its outstanding advances in terms of developing the most institutionalized
framework of political trolls in the modern world. Hence, the Russian case provides a
fruitful example of the online media campaign of an entirely new type. Importantly, despite
their precise empirical focus on a particular region, the results of this paper have broader
implications, especially, considering the recent growth of the importance of the cyber aspect
of politics.

4.2

Background and literature review

First of all, this paper contributes to the newly emerging literature in political science on
political astroturfing, or, as it was initially named, reverse censorship, started by King, Pan,
and Roberts (2013) in their discussion on China. Their paper argues that the Chinese
censors are mainly concerned with preventing mobilization but may allow for the critique of
the regime. In terms of the subject of the study, this work is closest to that of Sobolev (2017)
, who discusses both human and automated cases of astroturfing on Russian LiveJournal
and establishes that the political trolls have a limited effect on the online political discourse.
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In the meanwhile, Sanovich, Stukal, and J. A. Tucker (2017) investigate Russian bots on
Twitter and argue that it is possible to develop a framework that distinguishes them from
genuine regime supporters. Similar to Keller et al. (2017) , who studies political astroturfing
in South Korea, this article claims that the meta-data may be applicable for the identification
argument.
Meanwhile, to illustrate how the topics and the content of the contributions produced
by political trolls and their accomplices manifest the self-perception of the regime, it is
foremost essential to carefully place the study within the framework of existing qualitative
literature on the current Russian regime. Luckily, Journal of Democracy dedicates a large
share of its latest October 2017 issue to Putinism - the political regime that evolved over the
last 18 years since Putin became the Prime Minister of Russia. Six articles in a designated
section “The Kremlin Emboldened " focus on the topic from various perspectives, such as the
innate origins of (Fish, 2017) to the regime’s orientation towards the future (Kara-Murza,
2017) . These publications may disagree with one another in certain aspects, but they share
two common takeaway points about the modern Russian regime highly relevant to this
paper: (1) its conservatism along with a uniquely Russian variation of “populism” and (2)
its vastly developed “propaganda machine”, which it “uses more effectively than the Soviet
Union or Nazi Germany ever did” (Inozemtsev, 2017) . Likewise, another essential point
this paper recognizes is that most of those articles emphasize the importance of the regime
using “the Crimea" conflict as a strategy for bolstering the regime’s popularity, especially
given that there was an overall steep economic decline in Russia since 2014 but support for
Putin grew from approximately sixty percent to more than eighty percent. While this paper
looks at a very specific, politically-motivated phenomenon – political astroturfing, along with
contributions resembling its identifiers on Russian Wikipedia – it is also able to bridge the
general theory of National Role Conceptions (NRCs) recently developed by C. S. Thies
and M. Nieman (2017) in their upcoming volume and the comprehensive in-depth study of
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modern-day Russia presented by Fish (2017) , Aron (2017) , Inozemtsev (2017) , Robertson
and Greene (2017) , Shevtsova (2017) , and Kara-Murza (2017) , presented in the latest
Journal of Democracy.
In light of this, C. S. Thies and M. Nieman (2017) accomplish a tremendous task of
translating how the country’s history relates to the ideological regime’s self-perception (see
Figure 4.1). However, their classification is slightly dated and lacks relevance to the state
of affairs of the 21st century. Present-day Russia is very different from its 1999 days when
Putin was sworn into office. Indeed, the regime has had at least four distinct phases over the
last 17 years. The first period ended around 2003-2004 with the imprisonment of the oligarch
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Beslan massacre, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the
eventual elimination of the elected governors. The second interim lasted from 2004 to 2008
and was characterized by extremely high oil prices. It ended in 2008 when Medvedev came to
office. During this time, the Georgian War along with the global financial crisis marked the
complete end of this peaceful period. The third period occurred during Medvedev’s presidency
and ended with a wave of massive protests- mainly in Moscow and Saint Petersburg- when
Putin declared that he was planning to run for presidency again. The last phase began
in 2012, when the regime underwent tremendous transformation to a strong authoritarian
leadership that valued patriotic mobilization over economic growth and which is still in effect
today (Aron, 2017) ). Robertson and Greene (2017) present a detailed and substantive
explanation of all of these waves that characterize Russian leadership’s recent ideological
metamorphosis. This paper examines the very last period of Putin’s Russia, particularly at
its most authoritative incarnation – the time-period after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
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4.3

Research design

This work employs a mixed-methods approach by combining Big Data analysis and careful
substantive evaluation. It begins by introducing the Wikipedia platform and justifying its
relevance under the conditions of political salience, especially in the context of recent Russian
political affairs. The next section starts with the description of the existing evidence of “the
troll centers” in order to establish familiarity with the background of the topic of Russian
political astroturfing in its domestic context. Then, the text proceeds to explain how select
Wikipedia contributions may be linked to the available geographical information and the
location of the political trolls. Further, the research substantively evaluates the identified,
suspicious Wikipedia edits, first by looking at their meta-information and then by performing
a detailed examination of their content for detected potential instance of political astroturfing.
Combining all obtained evidence from both the geographical and substantive analyses, the
first section concludes with a compiled list of detected astroturfing interventions. The goal of
the following section is to extrapolate the results from the previous section and to uncover
a greater number of edits similar in content to the ones already identified as astroturfing
content. To do so, the paper also provides a methodology by which to compare the edits. In
particular, it proposes a novel measure for the comparison of the texts - conditional cosine
similarity. Next, the paper evaluates the content of the findings and postulates that despite
a detectable level of suspicious contributions, no evidence had been found of any systematic
and large-scale political astroturfing operation on Wikipedia. The paper concludes with a
discussion of the findings from the perspective of NRCs of present-day Russia.
This research mainly addresses two sets of questions, those concerning the identification
of political astroturfing and those dealing with the manifestation of the ideology and selfperceptions of Russia through political astroturfing:
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1) Can political astroturfing be identified on Wikipedia? What are its major
strategies?

2) Does the regime portray its ideology and self-perceptions though its political
astroturfing? Which special insights can be obtained by analyzing the instances of
political atroturfing on Wikipedia?

4.4

Wikipedia: Political and Historical Salience

This following assertion is the foundation of the main argument of this paper: that the
country’s history is a part of its self-perceived agenda and political astroturfing can be
seen as a manifestation of its influence. Indeed, if in response to highly salient political
events people’s curiosity about the events’ broad historical background is heightened, the
coordinators of political astoturfing that manage these newly acquired perceptions of the
public can anticipate the informational bias to work in benefit of their agenda. In more
general terms, it simply means that in this specific population, the projected self-perceptions,
an integral part of the regime’s ideology, must be entrenched with historical relevance, and
Wikipedia provides an exceptional chance to observe this trend.
To begin, Wikipedia, the largest collaborative network of knowledge, is the primary
source of information for the information generation. Interestingly enough, its impressive
coverage of numerous topics is a relatively recent phenomenon. Starting from a few thousand
articles on the English language Wikipedia in the mid-2002, in 2016, the cumulative number
of its articles spanning all its regional versions (nowadays, it operates in more than 100
languages) was approximately 39,721,659
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Crucially, a number of reasons justify looking particularly at the Russian version of
Wikipedia. Above all, the Russian segment of the Internet does not provide much alternative
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https://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/Sitemap.htm
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to Wikipedia in the sense of obtaining general, supposedly unbiased knowledge on almost
any topic. Furthermore, despite the span of more than twenty years since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russian is still the main language that a large share of the ex-Soviet Republics
population revert to in order to get access to a wider range of knowledge than is available
in their own languages. The Russian Wikipedia is one of the larger Wikipedias, with the
total number of 1,314,55643 ) pages. It has the third highest number of page views per hour,
after the English and the Spanish counterparts. This fact is especially impressive, given that
Russian language is ninth most spoken language in the world and has the seventh highest
number of Wikipedia pages. Regarding editing activity, it holds a high-ranking position as
well: it ranks fourth in terms of very active editors who make hundred or more edits per
month and the seventh among regular but less active users who make five or more edits per
month. Considering the relatively moderate number of Russian speakers in the world, this
statistic shows that the usage of Wikipedia in this demographic is wide-spread.
Despite these telling statistics about Russian Wikipedia usage, so far, its relevance
as a tool of investigation has been almost completely overlooked in the political science
field. Yet, Russian Wikipedia is perceived by the Russian-speaking world as a trusted media
source. To test this claim, this paper examines a highly salient case of the Ukrainian Crisis
of 2013-present. Having originated as a domestic Ukrainian issue, a revolution as a response
to the highly corrupt government of Yanukovich, the crisis slowly escalated after Russia’s
capture of the Ukrainian province of Crimea, which came to impact Russian citizens as well.
The official position of the Kremlin was that the intervention was necessary because the
Russians residing in Crimea - the majority of the population in the province - were in danger
under the new "highly nationalistic government” in Ukraine (Gentleman; Lally and Englund,
2014; 2014) . According to multiple sources, Russia got involved in a foreign military conflict,
often referred to as “a hybrid war" in the Eastern Ukraine, where ethnic Russians constitute
43
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a significant portion of the population. Ukraine’s widespread perception of these events was
that Russia (both the Russian government and its citizens) betrayed them by occupying their
territory and supporting the military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine (CNN, 2014) .
Figure 3.3 showcases the extent to which the topic of the Ukrainian crises occupied the
news feed of the only independent Russian TV channel, Dozhd. Labzina and M. Nieman
(2017) argue that Dozhd’s coverage very accurately reflects the actual events taking place
without any bias. The coverage of Ukrainian topics begins to climb steadily at the end
of October before the start of the Ukrainian protest (the vertical blue dashed line) and
exponentially grows just before the annexation of Crimea (the vertical red dashed line) in
March. Now, let us look at how these events paralleled the page viewing activity on Russian
Wikipedia.
First of all, Figure 4.2 illustrates that the amount of total page views did not exhibit
any exceptional spikes or trends. The dynamics mainly reflect the seasonal trends with
detectable traction. Meanwhile, the page views of the pages of the categories Ukraine (n=19),
Kiev (n=3), and Crimea (n=11) do emphasize an interesting pattern of engagement. Until
November 25th, the number of views fluctuates around its average mean of around 8,000
per day. With the start of the massive protests in Maidan, Kiev’s central city square, the
average slowly starts increasing and with some fluctuations, 10 days after the Rada 44 passes
“a harsh anti-protest legislation”, reaches a local apex of 26,871 views on January 26th (CSIS,
2016) . Then, after some decrease, it starts its rapid climb on February 17th, just before
Yanukovich fled Ukraine. A month later on March 18th, when Putin signed a document
confirming that “Crimea including Sevastopol would join Russia", the page views reached
a global unprecedented engagement of 362,840. This is approximately 45 times more than
before the start of the events in Maidan. This graph clearly indicates that people went online
to read articles related to the ongoing political events, but did not exactly contribute to the
44
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heated discourse. Hence, the numbers show that people did get curious about the history of
Crimea, Ukraine and Kiev as a response to related political events.
Summing up, Wikipedia gives an exceptional opportunity to acquire general insight
into the strategies and tactics of political astroturfing. Foremost, the ideological perception of
Russian Wikipedia is that it houses unbiased content. Secondly, the personal component of
the interaction is virtually missing: the contributors interact with the content and not with
one another. Finally, regarding data, Wikipedia is extremely user-friendly and transparent:
all history of the content and contributions is open and available in multiple formats. This
sharply contrasts to popular user-centered unprecedented networks, where one cannot access
a lot of content, most specifically, i.e LiveJournal, because of the privacy settings of the
users and the restrictions of the network itself (i.e Facebook, Twitter ) that are aimed to
commercialize user data.

4.5

Identifying Political Astroturfing

Methodologically, this part of the paper describes the conservative, or, in other in other words
minimizing the possibility of false positives, steps taken to identify what is further called
"the initial instances" of astroturfing on the Russian Wikipedia. The major challenge of this
task is the difficulty of relying solely on the content of the added or edited contributions.
The content may serve as supporting evidence; however, in isolation from other criteria, it
is incapable of discerning between the contribution of political trolls and genuine regime
supporters. The behavioral patterns, such as the typical time when the contributions occur
and the nature of their topics and content, can also be used to validate the hypothesis of
astroturfing (Keller et al. 2017, working paper; Sanovich, Stukal, and J. A. Tucker 2017,
working paper) but are usually not very helpful in indicating incidence of trolling at the very
beginning of the astroturfing investigation process.
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Acknowledging this, recent research on political astroturfing and its effects on public
discourse is typically based on the exogenous (to the content) criteria, or the explicit leakage
of official data. The possible documented leaks belong on the list of LiveJournal accounts of
political trolls that was obtained and released by the journalists of Novaya Gazeta in Russia
(Sobolev 2017, working paper). Likewise, a list of Twitter accounts found on confiscated
computers and published during court proceedings in South Korea (Keller et al. 2017, working
paper) was leaked in support of political troll presence, as was the uncovered Chinese
propaganda office communication leaks from its state officials (King, Pan, and Roberts 2016).
Regarding contributions to Wikipedia, such leaks are technically impossible, since a
large share of its most prolific contributors simply do not have functioning personal accounts.
Indeed, data shows that although many contributors do have registered accounts (n=168,362
45

), a significant share of the contributors do not have accounts (n = 1,563,624
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). The

contributions of non-registered individuals are easy to spot, as they are marked with their IP
addresses on an article’s history page. Interestingly, some of the IP contributors are very
active: 2,566 have completed more than 100 edits each, and 107 have contributed more than
1000 edits during the period from January 2013 to December 2016.
Hence, no apparent discernment of “political trolls" on Wikipedia accounts was detected.
Luckily for researchers, there is a major “leakage" in traditional and social media over the
last several years of the traces of the so-called "Russian political trolls". This section will
start with the brief overview of these publications and, based on them, propose to investigate
six possible locations of the "troll factories" employed for the purpose of skewing public
perception on political and historical subjects. In some cases, the locations of these factories
45

The total number of unique contributors with registered accounts for the period from January 2013 to
December 2016.
46
The total number of unique contributors without registered accounts for the period from January 2013
to December 2016
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are provided with the exact known street address, and other times, they are known to extend
into small regional settlements.
Furthermore, the section continues by describing how the IP addresses of the contributors
can be connected to the geographical information of the identified troll factories. Then,
the careful spatial analysis enables us to narrow down the list of suspect IP addresses to
approximately ten IP ranges. The last step in the analysis of their contributions is the manual
content evaluation based on specific language parameters and topic analysis elaborated on in
subsequent sections (n = 88). The substantive analysis concludes that among the suspect IP
addresses, two provide consistent evidence of astroturfing. Their contributions are marked
as the initial astroturfing interventions. In the following section, the two IP addresses are
analyzed specifically in order to find and match similar content.

4.5.1

The Troll Factories

On September 9th, 2013, the major Russian independent newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, famous
for its field journalism, published investigation conclusions from their Saint-Petersburg
correspondent (Garmajalova, 2013) . In the article, the investigative journalist describes
her experience of getting a job in the so-called Agency of Internet Research, located in a
small satellite town close to Saint-Petersburg. Later, this place would become infamous as a
“troll factory", a hub of fake account holders posing as authentic individuals with the intent
to promote particular sociopolitical viewpoints, or “Olgino". She finds this job through an
open ad published on Russian social media networks (see the ad for the job in Figure 4.4).
According to the article, her responsibilities were to write short content on various Russian
online platforms discussing topics that support an assigned point of view. For example, her
first assignment was to cover the G-20 Summit in Saint Petersburg, during which she had
to publish around 100 comments during one business day. The journalist writes that she
saw screen-shots of the published content of her predecessors who criticized America and the
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Russian opposition politician Alexey Navalny (Figure 4.6 provides an example of an actual
assignment performed by a political troll).
This journalism piece is crucial, since it was the first to introduce the meaning of “the
troll”, “the state paid troll” or “the agents” of astroturfing in the Russian political context. This
definition contrasts sharply with the previous existing notion of casual “trolling" by random
individuals who share their organic perspectives. In 2012, the same newspaper published an
article about the rapidly evolving phenomenon of “trolling" prevalent on the Russian Internet
(Grigorieva and Chuvilyaev, 2012) . "Trolling" is ubiquitously defined as “[the] continuous
generation of meaningless text that is embedded with useful information". However, there
is substantial distinction between the definitions present in the articles published in 2012
and those in 2013. Above all, the 2012 content depicts “trolling" as instigated by multiple
freelance (paid or non-paid) individuals. The article from 2012 further mentions that paid
assignments may be political or commercial in nature, but it does not specify anything about
“troll factories". For instance, it includes an interview with “an informed professional troll",
who gave the general impression that back then, paid political trolling was more so related to
"product placement" as a byproduct of mild political propaganda. Meanwhile, the article from
2013 precisely talks about institutionalized “factories of trolls”. Furthermore, in 2015 (Chen,
2015) , the New York Times Magazine dedicated a long piece to the very same “Internet
Research Agency” – one of the factories of trolls – that “had industrialized the art of trolling"
and that was run under management which was “obsessed with page view statistics, number
of posts and the blog ranking on LiveJournal traffic charts" (Chen, 2015) ). This specific
piece talks about factories of trolls as seriously organized, well-established structures that do
not have much in common with the unregulated freelance trend described in 2012 by Novaya
Gazeta. Based on these pieces, it can be concluded that in Russia, political trolling became
institutionalized somewhere between 2012 and 2013. Furthermore, in 2015 in particular,
the phenomenon was already operating under an advanced infrastructure wielding its own
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personnel (Chen, 2015) , which interestingly contrasts with the situation in China, where
political trolling is a regular side activity of state officials (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2016) .
In the latter part of 2015, a greater number of journalist articles covering Russian
political trolls emerged (BBC; Gordon, 2015; 2015) , following the empirical inquiry of a
LiveJournal blogger four3. Interestingly enough, this blogger’s investigation used Google
Trends to show that four locations in Russia (within small indigenous populations) produced
the majority of Google requests on the topic of the Ukrainian crisis, significantly outnumbering
large cities like Moscow in this regard47 . The blogger compares the geographical distributions
of Google search requests for salient terms related to the controversial issues of recent Russian
politics with politically neutral terms. As expected, he finds that for the non-political
search requests, the major cities are on the top of the list. However, for the salient topic
of Ukrainian politics,
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the discovered results can only be explained by the existence of

the Russian “11-ruble” army – the equivalent to the Chinese "50-cent" party – situated at
various designated locations. Since this online tool is open to public at no cost, anyone can
go to Google Trends and obtain the same results. Interestingly, one of the detected locations,
Olgino, has been well-known since 2013 as a hot spot of trolls expounding one-sided political
views (Garmajalova, 2013) .
Based on the analysis of the described media sources, the following section of the paper
looks into six suspect locations as the possible origins of Russian political astroturfing.
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Perekatny, Zelenyy Gorod, Olgino, Yablonosky
Maidan - "a city square" in Ukrainian. Recently, the term is most often used to refer to The Square
of Independence in Kiev, Ukraine. Also, in Russian, the term became almost synonymous with the term
revolution or the Ukrainian Revolution in 2014 or Euromaidan.sanctions - refers to the Western sanction as a
response to the Russian intervention to the Crimea., referendum - The Crimean referendum of 2014, and
Poroshenko - the Ukrainian president elected after the revolution in 2014.
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4.5.2

IP addresses and geographical location

IP addresses carry geographic information of the user source. This research makes use of one
of the most comprehensive databases that connects the IP-ranges to the exact geographic
coordinates49 . This dataset covers 11,547,800 IP ranges, each of which is accompanied by a
geographic location that can be identified on the map (see Figure 4.8 for the extract of this
data),
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overall and 142,193 in Russia in particular. The analysis starts with the extraction

of latitude and longitude of the suspect troll location using Google Maps (see Figure 4.1,
Table 4.1). Next, each entry from the DB-IP is assigned the distance to each of the suspect
astroturfing locations using a programming script. Additionally, another script selects all IP
ranges within three miles from at least one of the suspect locations (n = 944). The position
of these ranges are then imported to Google Maps for visual expert selection. The visual
analysis is necessary because the density of the DB-IP coverage varies. It is necessary to take
into account the features of the landscape while selecting the IP ranges for more detailed
investigation (see Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11).
Interestingly enough, three of the locations - Olgino, Perekatny and Zelenyy Gorod
- do not have any entries from the DB-IP database exactly near them. Meanwhile, the
other three may be linked to the database: the analysis identifies nine suspect ranges (see
Table 4.1). Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 show the selection process: the stars refer to the
assumed “troll factories” 51 , the blue drops refer to the locations of the IP ranges in the DB-IP
address dataset, and finally, the yellow speakers are the “drops” assigned to represent the
“troll factories”. Overall, the paper assigns suspect eighteen IP-ranges.
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The DB-IP database https://db-ip.com/about/
IP-range and includes information on all IP addresses found in this dataset range. IPv4 addresses are
usually represented in dot-decimal notation, consisting of four decimal numbers, each ranging from 0 to 255,
separated by dots, e.g., 172.16.254.1. Each part represents a group of 8 bits (octet) of the address.
51
In the case of Savushkina street and Varvarskaya Street, the street address is known; in the case of
Yablonovsky, the analysis assumes a median position in the middle of the small settlement
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The meta information on the contributions to the Russian Wikipedia is available in
xml-wiki dumps (see Figure 4.12 for an extract). Each node (page) carries information about
all its contribution content. Likewise, each contribution (revision) includes information on its
author and the exact time of posting. The revisions id and parentid, along with the article’s
title, provide sufficient information on all the details of relevant modifications. Figure 4.13
shows the webpage and its address for one of the revisions shown on Figure 4.12.
After parsing the total of 22,674,100 contributions52 , the analysis discovers that 88
written contributions were made from one of the suspicious IPs. Interestingly, all of them
are attributed to one of the two IP ranges assigned to the same location of Yablonovsky, a
small settlement near Krasnodar with a total population of less than 2,100 people. Curiously,
Yablonovsky was listed as a potential source of political trolling in one blogger’s striking
investigation using Google Trends, as described in the previous subsection. The total number
of the distinct IPs among the selected is eighteen and of the distinct articles is sixty three.

4.5.3

Substantive analysis

So far, all of the identified edits only weakly confirm this hypothesis based on the available
geographic information. Prior to this subsection, the research has not looked at either the
time-restricted behavior patterns (the time-frame when the edits were made) nor at the
topics and content of the edits. Before digging into the detailed overview of the content of
the edits, let us first look at the basic summary of the Wikipedia contributions grouped by
IPs provided in Table 4.2.

Meta-data
Foremost, as exemplified, thirteen of the eighteen individual contributors are responsible
for editing a single page. One individual is responsible for editing two pages and another
52

All contribution on the Russian Wikipedia during the period from January 2013 to December 2016
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individual four pages. There are only three individuals in this dataset who display a relative
diversity in their interests: with 18, 19, and 8 articles. Secondly, it can be concluded that
out of the three active editors in the dataset, one has consistently contributed to the articles
about online computer games - a topic very distant to Russian politics or history.
Meanwhile, most edits from other most active editors (with several exceptions) are made
on topics that most possibly contain sensitive information related to current Russian politics
and national ideology: settlements within Russia and the former Soviet Union (Ashgabat,
Lipetsk, Sochi, Seversky Donets, Donetsk (Russia), Dubossary, Starominskaya, Kharkov,
Kramatorsk ), Russian history (Yuri Dolgoruky53 , Cossacks, The culture of ancient Russia,
Russians in Kazakhstan, Pavlov, Sergey Vasilievich), recent Russian wars (Georgia; Khankarov,
Khamzat Zharapovich; Semenchenko54 , Semyon Igorevich Semenchenko55 ), science in Russia
(Cell theory), and Islam and terrorism (Charlie Hebdo).
The interest of one of those editors in topics related to Ukraine (Seversky Donets,
Donetsk (Russia), Dubossary, the culture of ancient Russia, Khankarov, Semenchenko), the
Chechen War (Khankarov) and Islamic terrorism (Charlie Hebdo) looks especially striking.
Another editor mainly contributed to the articles related to the recent and ancient Russian
history (Cossacks, Culture of Ancient Russia, Russians in Kazakhstan) as well as to Ukraine
(Cossacks, Kramatorsk).
Based on the geographic and meta data analyses, the Wikipedia contributions from the
identified editors are highly suspect to be a part of Russian political astroturfing efforts. The
next step in confirming this hypothesis is to carefully evaluate the content of the contributions
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The founder of Moscow.
Khamzat Zharapovich Khankarov (Honkarov) (April 13, 1965, Grozny, USSR - June 13, 1994, Grozny,
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria) is a Chechen field commander, an active participant in the separatist movement
in Chechnya.
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Semen Ihorovych Semenchenko is a deputy to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the commanderfounder of the volunteer territorial defence battalion "Donbas", based in Donetsk during the current military
conflict in the Eastern Ukraine.
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and establish whether they support the initial analysis. We can start by first comprehending
the ideology and the typical pattern of behavior of Russian political trolls.
Strategies, Tactics, and Ideology of Russian political trolls
According to the leakages from the Russian "troll factories" (Chen; Garmajalova;
Grigorieva and Chuvilyaev, 2015; 2013; 2012) , Russian political trolls are mostly concerned
with four broad topics (*):

- The opposition leader Alexey Navalny and the Russian political opposition in general ;
- Ukraine and everything related to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict after the Ukrainian
revolution in 2014 and the consequent annexation of Crimea;
- The greatness of Russia and Russians (referring primarily to Russians of Slavic
ethnicity). Russia is viewed as the direct and only ethnic and cultural descendent of Kievan
Rus’ (the late 9th to the mid-13th century), the Tsardom of Russia (1547 – 1721), the Russian
Empire (1721 – 1917), and the Soviet Union (1922 – 1991).
- The critique of the USA and its foreign policy.

In particular, according to the existing journalism, social media, and academic evidence, Ukraine is the major topic of interest for Russian trolls and bots. In his New York
Times article (Chen, 2015) on "The Internet Research Agency", Chen cites one of the
agency employees:“Ukraine was always a major topic, because of the civil war there between
Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian Army; [the employee] and her co-workers would
post comments that disparaged the Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, and highlighted
Ukrainian Army atrocities. Russian domestic affairs were also a major topic of discussion.
Last year, after a financial crisis hit Russia and the ruble collapsed, the professional trolls
left optimistic posts about the pace of recovery."
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Many sources on Russian political trolls emphasize that working hours of the trolls
usually range from 8am to 10pm (Garmajalova, 2013) . Hence, it is reasonable to conclude
that the contributions during or close to these hours are more likely to turn out to be instances
of astroturfing.
Another source is a well-known Russian blogger who provides an insider, counter
perspective on troll detection: he claims that after reading more than 700,000 comments
on his blog postings, he learned to detect kremlibots (from "Kremlin bots"), a term he uses
to refer to the Russian political trolls (Chernyshov, 2014) . The blogger provides several
characteristics of suspected political trolling that is related to particular language usage
and which is relevant to this analysis. He claims that “one of their characteristics is their
contempt for the Russian language. This underlies that they are common people." By this,
the blogger means that they are likely to misspell words and use vulgar slang and offensive
tone (**).
Based on all the existing information about the strategies and tactics of Russian political
trolls, the conclusive observation is that they are likely to employ one or a combination of
two of the following strategies: direct misbehavior that is easily detectable (in the context
of Wikipedia, the best way to refer to it is vandalism (V )), and subtle manipulation of
information (in Wikipedia, this is likely to show up as an attempt to change the tone of the
text through deletion (D), as well as through slight changes in wording). Likewise, suspect
atroturfing contributions must also satisfy topic criteria relevant to social, economic and
political affairs.

Content evaluation
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Table 4.6 shows the summary of the evaluation for the contributions listed in Table
4.2. The criteria for considering whether an edit is an instance of political astroturfing is
whether it falls into one of the topics presented above (*) and whether the edit parallels
the ideological interests of the current Russian regime56 . Based on this methodology, it is
interesting that the same IPs the research had “suspected” based on their meta-data precisely
fit the criteria. No other IP address produced anything even close to resembling astroturfing.
All analyzed contributions from editors other than them were genuinely looking to improve
the informational quality of the articles. Another somewhat surprising observation is the
same editors are the only ones on the list who had “vandalic” contributions. Furthermore,
one of the them did not produce any valuable edits at all. Also, both the suspect editors
have IP addresses from the same IP range, while all others originate from other ranges.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present brief descriptions of the edits labeled as political astroturfing.
All edits in the tables are labeled as D or V. The D stands for the “clever type” of astroturfing,
when certain information pieces are simply deleted from the article yet leave it seemingly
still completely legitimate. The findings of type D are especially interesting because they
provide a somewhat unexpected insight into the type of information the political trolls do not
wish the readers to see in the articles. They enable researchers to get a better sense of the
NRCs of modern Russia (Figure 4.14 displays a typical example of D). The discussion section
focuses on their content in detail. Their existence is almost surprising because political trolls
are more likely to be associated with vandal type of behavior. Both of the identified editors
showcase elements of type V edits as well. Furthermore, all of their type V edits involve
misspelled words and/or vulgar, colloquial slang that according to Chernyshov (2014) ,
speaks in favor of the political trolls’ authorship (Figure 4.15 displays a typical example of
V).
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The screen-shots of all these edits are available as supplementary materials
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After labeling the suspect contributions as acts of astroturfing/non-astroturfing, the last
investigative component was to look at their chronological behavior. Figure 4.16 plots the
times of the suspect edits. One striking observation is that except for three contributions made
in the night-time there is a clear time separation between the astroturfing and non-astroturfing
edits coming from these users. Also, the time-frame of the contributions looks surprising: the
majority of the edits are completed within a narrow time period during weekday working
days from 11am to 3pm. With one exception on October 3rd, 2016, literally all contributions
are performed within the time-frame window of 7.30am to 10pm. Likewise, the working
hours in the troll centers range from 8pm to 10pm. Furthermore, because of multiple changes
regarding the summer/winter savings time shift in Russia since 2008, it is highly likely that
the time of the edit on June 20 was misrecorded, and that it was actually made at 8.30am
and not at 7.30am. Overall, the distribution of the hours of the astroturfing observations
does not look random: there are 5 observations at exactly 2.30pm and 6 observations around
12pm.

4.5.4

Finding Accomplices: Extrapolation

The previous sections describe the deductive process of identifying a list of astroturfing
interventions. The analysis uses the available geographical data of “the troll factories" and
then examines the content of the contributions and edits coming from IPs located close to
these locations. Given these evaluation parameters, the paper concludes that two IP address
from the same IP range exhibit behavior consistent with the hypothesis of astroturfing. This
section extrapolates the findings of the previous section to uncover more instances of similar
Wikipedia contributions.
Based on the located astroturfing edits, the analysis narrows its attention to the
categories that have proven to attract perpetrators of astroturfing (see Table 4.6 and 4.7).
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With these categories in place to filter all Russian Wikipedia articles, the size of the number
of the edits decreased from 22,674,100 to 149,894.
Most importantly, this section presents those contributions that appear very similar
both in terms of the behavioral patterns they exhibit and the nature of content they showcase.
Despite these analytical possibilities, it is unreasonable to claim that astroturfing content
mostly derives from individuals who are state employees. Hence, this section refers to the
diverse range of identified contributors as “astroturfing accomplices".

Comparison of Wikipedia Contributions
Comparing Wikipedia contributions is a tricky process. Most often, addition or deletion of
content does not occur in the format of a proper sentence or sentences. It may not even be a
phrase. In fact, many of such contributions consist of small fragments of text that are added
or deleted in multiple locations of an article. Another challenge to detecting changes to text
is how the history of Wikipedia edits is stored: the XML-wikidumps store each edited version
of the article, and the discrepancies between them are not easy to capture. Luckily, the
online version of the edits contains explicit indication of which parts of an article have been
modified. Hence, their HTML code may be directly parsed. Most importantly, because of
the fragmentary content of the edits, the best approach towards investigating their intended
function is to construct a dictionary compilation with the words and their frequencies.
Finally, before the contraction of the dictionary and after the removal of stopwords
from the text, there is a need for careful lemmatization, or extraction of the word stems.
Russian is one of the most inflectional languages in the world. It is one of the IndoEuropean languages that retained a lot of its word ending flexibility from its proto-language,
ancient Sanskrit. For example, all these words - московский, московского, московским,
московскому, московском, московская, московскую, московской, московское, московские,
московских, московских, московскими - are translated as Moscow (adjective) in English.
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To perform the lemmatization or stemming, this paper utilizes the most efficient stemming
tool for languages other than English, Snowball (StemmersNet 2012).

The algorithm for constructing a dictionary for edit comparison (***):

- Open the web-page with the description of an edit;
- By parsing the HTML of the page, collect all deletions {d} ;
- Remove the stop-words from {d};
- Do the lemmatization of {d} ;
- Make a list of pairs (further refered as dictionary) - a stem and the number of
its occurrences in {d};
Before applying (***) to edits, the analysis generates a dictionary of the astroturfing
edits to be used for comparison. To do that, it collects all deletions from the identified
astroturfing edits and applies the same steps as in (***): removes the stopwords, performs
lemmatization, generates a dictionary - D (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10 for this dictionary).
Then, for a similarity measure M (.), the score for an edit X: score(X) = M (D, X|{d}).
In other words, the score of an edit equals the similarity of the deleted part of X and D. In
the following subsection, the paper will introduce the similarity measure.

4.5.5

Measure: Conditional Cosine Similarity

In the previous subsection, the paper presented ways that suspect trolls engage Wikipedia
contributions. The proposed unit of analysis is a dictionary of used terms after stemming
and removal of the stop words57 . Tables 4.9 and 4.10 showcase the dictionary of terms for
detected instances of atroturfing. In terms of data interpretation, the nature of the data calls
57

The stop words are the most general words in the language that do not carry any substantive information.
For a detailed list, see supplementary materials.
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for a measuring methodology that is not sensitive to the order of the words but is rather
sensitive to the term frequency.
An intuitive way to capture the distance between two dictionaries is to use the cosine
similarity method of analysis. For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that the terms are the
same in the dictionaries and equal to n. Then, each dictionary becomes a vector in the
n-space where each term represents a dimension. Further, the cosine similarity is the cosine
of the angle θ between two vectors or dictionaries (X and Y) and can be calculated with the
following formula:
N
P

X i Yi
X ·Y
i=1
s
cos(θ) =
=s
||X||2 ||Y ||2
N
N
P
P
Xi2
Yi2
i=1

(4.1)

i=1

By definition, both dictionaries are not empty, hence the value is defined. Since cos(0) =
1, the smaller the angle, the closer is its measure to the unity. If the dictionaries have nothing
in common, or in spatial terms are orthogonal, then cos( π2 ) = 0. Since all frequencies must be
non-negative, the cosine similarity ranges from 0 to 1. Another advantage of this measure is
that it reflects only the proportions between the magnitudes of the terms in a dictionary but
not the absolute magnitude, meaning that the angle between X and Y is the same as αX
and βY (α and β are positive), and so is the cosine similarity.
The only problem with using this measure is that it assumes the same set of terms in both
dictionaries. For example, if a term is missing in one dictionary, that increases the distance
between the dictionaries. In some cases, this might not be a problem. Meanwhile, in this
analysis the edits are compared with the dictionary of the detected astroturfing interventions
in order to ascertain common values. This dictionary is likely to have more terminology
than most contributions to compare. Substantively, it is enough if the edits are close in
meaning when it comes to their common non-zero terms. For example, for the comprehensive
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dictionary, A={russia=1, moscow=1, kremlin=1} and for the edit, x={russia=1, moscow=1}
the desired distance is 1, since x fully corresponds to A. Meanwhile, according to (4.1), it is
q
2
< 1.
3
However, for the purposes of this analysis, if a term is present in the contribution
edit but is missing in the dictionary of the astroturfing contributions, which is assumed
comprehensive, that should increase the association distance between them.
If Y is the comprehensive dictionary and X is the observation comparison to Y, then in
spatial terms, this analysis desires to capture not the distance between X and Y but rather
X and the projection of Y to the space of X. The paper introduces the cosine similarity
conditional on X or the conditional cosine similarity, which fully satisfies the purposes of this
analysis. If D is the set of the terms in Y and E is the set of terms in X
P
Xi Yi
Xi Yi
i∈E
i∈E
rP
rP
= rP
cos(θ|X) = r P
Xi2
Yi2
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I(i ∈ E)Yi2
P

i∈E

i∈E

where:
I(i ∈ E) =

i∈E

(4.2)

i∈D




1, if i ∈ E


0, if i ∈
/E

To simplify the findings, what the measurement implies is that only those terms
originating from the Y value affect the measures that are also in X, but not the other way
around. Likewise, all terms from the X value that are not found in the Y value increase
the association distance between the two. Further, the paper uses (4.2) to propose that a
Wikipedia edit is similar to the identified instances of atroturfing. As it will be demonstrated,
this measure enables the ability to detect the edits of an examined deletion pretty accurately.
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4.5.6

Results

The measure of (4.2) conditional cosine similarity, whicg was introduced in the previous
subsection, enables comparing an edit to the collection of identified contributions of atroturfing.
So far, this paper concluded that the whole telling sign of what makes these contributions
suspicious is what information gets erased. Hence, the analysis of the edits focuses on
the deletion aspect of an edit. The crucial point to keep in mind before performing the
extrapolation of the initial findings, e.g looking for similar edits, is that the same words may
be used among different word meanings and phrases. Given this dissonance between word
intention and usage, the high values of the similarity score is a necessary but insufficient
condition to identify greater instances of political atroturfing. Hence, the substantive step of
the analysis (when an expert evaluates an edit thoroughly) is required. Another crucial point
is that, as already highlighted, even the edits that substantively correspond to the criteria of
political atroturfing cannot be confidently labeled as such.
Obviously, individuals making edits similar to the identified instances of astroturfing
may be genuine regime supporters and have nothing to do with troll factories. If that is so,
then why it is of importance to look for such edits? The core answer to this inquiry within
the major argument of the paper is as follows. Even if the edits identified in this section are
not direct cases of genuine political astroturfing (which some of them may easily be), they do
represent the very same ideology as political trolls, and consequently impact a sizable share of
the Russian (and even Russian-speaking) population that is susceptible to these sentiments.
Indeed, as Cantir и Kaarbo 2012b illustrated, despite the fact that the self-perceptions of
the regime are primarily shared among the political elites, a part of the population readily
shares them as well. Since this paper is curious about the ideology and the self-perceptions of
a regime manifested as a result of political astroturfing, then if a broader set of contributions
carries the same ideological insights, they should also be included in the analysis. This is
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especially the case if they lead to the same conclusions as the findings from the previous
section.
Out of 149,894 contributions (of the articles of the categories shown in Tables 4.6, 4.7,
and 4.8) included in the analysis, 25,586 have positive conditional cosine similarity values,
3,795 have scores greater than 0.9, and 3425 equal to 1 (see Figure 4.17). Then, the substantive
manual analysis is performed regarding all edits with a score greater than 0.9. Foremost,
across all categories, the share of vandalism edits is approximately 6%. Concurrently, the
substantive analysis does not find any significant share of contributions that are similar to the
identified instances of astroturfing from the previous section. With an in-depth examination
across all categories, they only constitute approximately 2-5% of contributions examined,
including vandalism, which usually involves misspelling of words that aims to taint the
meaning and interpretation behind certain topics.
On the other hand, the situation changes dramatically if the analysis narrows down
to the set of articles somewhat related to the 2014-present war in the Eastern Ukraine, or,
as it is usually referred to, the War in Donbass58 . For instance, among the edits for the
articles from the category “the cities of Donetsk region"(n=52) with the score greater than
0.9 (n=283) only around 44% are completely ideologically neutral. The rest is basically
the editing war with the shares approximately evenly divided between the proponents of
the pro-Russian militant groups of the newly created self-proclaimed states - DPR59 and
LPR60 - and their opponents who mainly hold a neural point of view, which is anti-DPR
and LPR. The contributions from this “editing war” are very specific and because of their
multiple contributors, they appear like an actual grassroots initiative and not an initiative
of astroturfing. Meanwhile, what is fascinating and relevant within the main argument of
this paper is that they share some interesting similarities with type D contributions from
58

The region in the Eastern Ukraine where are military actions were happening
Donetsk People’s Republic - ДНР (Донецкая народная республика)
60
Lugansk People’s Republic - ЛНР (Луганская народная республика)
59
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the previous section. Before talking about these similarities, it makes sense to describe this
“editing war” in more detail.
There is a major clear repetitive pattern across most of its edits: several specific groups
of words got changed back and forth. The first group is the country attribution. For the cities
in this region, the country attribution was changed in both directions from the self-proclaimed
“DNR” or even “DNR (Russia)” to “Ukraine”. The second group of the typical substitution
edits is the ways to characterize the militant groups controlling the region. Their reference
got changed multiple times in both directions from the supportive "insurgent"(opolchency or
ополченцы) to negative (through corresponding to the internationally accepted point of view)
“separatists” (separatisty or сепаратисты) or even strictly negative “terrorists” (terroristy or
террористы).
Furthermore, there is an interesting point to add concerning this “replacement editing
war”. Foremost, there is certain type of information that gets deleted (not substituted): the
mention of Russia’s direct involvement in the conflict, particularly the labeling of separatist
military forces as "pro-Russian”. In addition to that, in the case that the civil citizens were
subjected to some danger, the reference to “insurgents” is either removed completely or
replaced with the reference to the Ukrainian army.
Summing up the edits, it looks like the goal behind them is to distance Russia and
its military’s involvement from the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine. The only “acceptable”
reference to Russia is that the insurgents are “pro-Russian”. Interestingly, this corresponds to
Putin’s numerous interviews that he gave in 2014 and 2015, in which he insisted that there
is no Russian troop presence in the Eastern Ukraine (Insider; Jazeera; News, 2015; 2014;
2014) Secondly, another apparent aim is to dissociate the insurgents from the situations that
placed the civil local population in danger, and instead blame the Ukrainian military forces
for those actions.
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4.6

Discourse analysis: Political Astroturfing in the Historical
Perspective

By combining quantitative and qualitative techniques, the research identified a set of Wikipedia
contributions that satisfy geographical, meta-data, and content requirements to be considered
as part of the political troll campaign, which were derived from existing work on Russian
political trolls. This study interprets the detected instances of astroturfing (Tables 4.4 and 4.5)
as the part of the Russian ideological campaign after the 2014 conflict in Crimea. Foremost,
the identified instances of astroturfing correspond to the central notion of the regime’s
conservative ideology towards Russian history. As Aron (2017) states, all recent Russian
ideology centers on the pursuit of national glory. For instance, this glorification of the past
mirrors the recent move to make the celebration of the end of WWII as a main national
holiday. In general, this ideology simultaneously “features a soup of czarist, Soviet, and
post-Communist origin“ (Shevtsova, 2017) , when in reality, these origins may often conflict
with one another. For instance, as it is listed in the deletions in Table 4.4, those who fought
against the Red Army to save the Russian Empire in the Civil War of 1917-1921 and joined
the Nazis 20 years later to fight against the communists do not fit this idealized origin of
Russia’s domestic unity and regime support. At the same time, the ideology of Russia’s
“pursuit of national glory"is inseparable from keeping and further enlarging the country’s
territory. This leads to the importance of using a NRC rhetoric of a “regional integrator”, and
as this research argues, this agenda is most prevalent in the identified instances of astroturfing.
To highlight the widespread use of the integrator dogma, C. S. Thies и M. Nieman (2017)
point to the pervasive usage of this NRC on their list of identified cases of astrotufing from
the 2000s.
Unfortunately, expounding ideology is quite different from the act of inciting war and
enlarging the county’s territory, which may involve infrastructural devastation and many
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casualties. Also, the “united” territories may not always be satisfied with their occupied
status. Nonetheless, the regime is innately populist and chooses to enact its patriotic vision
no matter the level of destruction or backlash. As Shevtsova (2017) states: "historically,
Russian regimes prepared to resort to sweeping regression and the human loss it entails have
faced a population that is accustomed to viewing self-sacrifice as a natural duty, even a way
of life. Today, however, Russia’s people are not ready to make sacrifices for the sake of the
system."This means that the current ideology must work hard to “sell” the exhausted need
for territorial expansion as an act of greater good for the common Russian. The general
impression must be that the joining of annexed territories is a welcome act of those territories
who desire to be a part of Russia’s new destiny and that their compliance would be carried
out without military involvement. Further, the vision suggests that the only military that
might be fighting to join Russia are local volunteers, who will ensure that there is no blood
on their hands and that the Russian public will never hear of any victims. Also, the ideology
insinuates that all territories occupied by Russia have always lived happily in peace and
desire to be "Russified"under the label of "friendship of the peoples" (Fish, 2017) . And for
those who were against the influence (if it rarely ever happened), were traitors and ungrateful
after everything beneficial that Russia had done for them.
In regards to the Wikipedia article on the country of Georgia (see Table 4.4), the
following edits were found to fit this precise pattern of the glorification ideology: the removal
of the information about the anti-Russian appraising in 1819, the pro-Georgian language
demonstrations in 1978, the bloodshed during the suppression of the pro-independence
protests in 1989, and the Russian occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in 2008. The same can be noted about the deletion of the mention of the
disastrous Circassian genocide that occurred at the end of the Russo-Circassian War in
1864-67 in the article on Sochi. Since all the territories readily “joined” Russia and were
never “conquered the replacement of the word “conquest” with “inclusion” in the article
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about Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, matches the same pattern of strategic word
replacement as well. The modification in the article about Russians in Kazakhstan provides a
more subtle example. Whatever was the actual reason why a large number of ethnic Russians
left Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union, the initial phrase “the loss of the privileged
status within the USSR"(that would refer to the violation of the perfect picture of “the
friendship of the peoples” in USSR) was replaced with the phrase “the suppression”, which
told a very different story of the events that took place. This filtered version of history does
complement another case of censorship of the word “bandit”, a recently deleted term and
a name previously associated with the Cossacks, a group of East Slavic people located in
Russia and Ukraine, who, despite frequent conflicts with the Russian Empire, played a crucial
role in the Empire’s expansion.
Even the most recent Russian military conflicts are used as ploy to degrade the enemy
and bolster Russia as a heroic nation. For instance, the way some articles related to the wars
in Chechnya (the first of 1994-1996 and the second during 1999-2000, as well as the whole
Chechen independence movement) and the hybrid war in the Eastern Ukraine starting in
2014 were also manipulated through “vandalism signals the (strategically senseless) desire of
the content editors to ideologically shape the attitude towards “traitors”. In an article about
Khankarov, one of the guerrilla fighters during the first Chechen War, the neutral word for
“died” (umer ) is replaced with its rude colloquial synonym, (sdokh), which is usually used to
refer to the death of a person not worthy of respect. In an article about Lipetsk, the adjective
“bandit” is added to describe Poroshenko, the current Ukrainian President and oligarch, who
owns a candy factory in this Russian city. Similarly, one of the Ukrainian fighters in the
Ukrainian conflict, Semenchenko, was given “a war criminal” association in a biographic page
and his ethnic group was changed from “Russian” to “unknown”. Interestingly, this pattern of
content manipulation resembles another “vandal” edit to an article about a WWI soldier from
Ukraine, Pavlov Sergey Vasilievich, who later fought against the Bolsheviks in the Civil War
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and then joined the Nazis in the war against the USSR. In the edit, “the prominent figure of
the Don history” is replaced with “a traitor and criminal”. Apparently, the contributors to
these edits are concerned with the favorable presence of the Ukrainian influence as well as
Ukrainian nationalism. The mention of the famous writers and Ukrainian nationalists, the
Kapranowowie brothers, was removed from the article on Dubossary, a Moldovian city where
they resided.
Considering the implication of all these edits, it is clear that the political trolls sought
not only to promote the self-perceived role of Russia as a regional integrator but to also act
as a peaceful regional integrator that feeds into the desired view of homeland for the average
Russian citizen. According to C. S. Thies и M. Nieman (2017) , holding this NRC or its
modification as a regional liberator has been a typical approach of Russia and the Soviet
Union for most of the time-frame they cover in their book.
Among the numerous detected astroturfing edits, two specific “deletion” edits relate to
the military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine. For instance, this is most evident in an article
about the river Seversky Donets, which was mentioned in an edited note to serve as the border
between the territories controlled by the Ukrainian military forces and the insurgent army,
and in an article about Kramatorsk, where there was deliberate removal of the information
about the attacks on the city by the insurgent army that placed the civil population in danger.
Curiously, as described in detail in the previous section, the extrapolation of the detected
instances of political astroturfing had uncovered only edits related to the Ukrainian topic.
Hence, according to the findings of this paper, only this topic became viral among regular
contributors. Most likely, this behavior was not calculated among groups of political trolls
but most likely conducted independently. But why? As already noted before, the annexation
of Crimea and the consequent rise of Russian nationalism was the main (and probably the
only) successful ideological outcome of Putin’s regime. The findings in this paper confirm
this assertion.
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Another self-perceived role that left a trace of influence in the detected astroturfing
edits is “defender of the faith”. As Fish (2017) notices about Putin, “he ostentatiously blesses
Russia’s traditional religions, especially, the majority faith of Orthodox Christianity, but also
Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism”, while being nonreligious. For the current Russian ideology,
religion is a part of a conservative and traditionalist paradigm of authority. Religion also serves
the purpose of distinguishing Russia from the West, which is not Orthodox Christian. While
the idea of religion is mainly centered on Orthodox Christianity, Islam, as the second largest
practiced religion in Russia, is handled very strategically as well. For example, according
to Russian law, when mentioning the Islamic State publicly, one must also distinguish that
it is an “ organization forbidden in Russia” in order to separate the organization from the
common Islamic faith (Fish, 2017) . The traces of this self-perceived role are significantly less
apparent than the “regional integrator”, and it was not confirmed that its influence attracted
any genuine contributors. The research detected five edits corresponding to it in a page about
the French magazine Charlie Hebdo. Four out of five of these edits were “vandalistic”, in that
they used offensive words to characterize the main journalist of the magazine.

4.7

Conclusion

This work has confirmed that political astroturfing attempts are detectable on Wikipedia
and their contents clearly confirm the most up-to-date insights of political science research
about the nature of the ideology and self-perception of the current Russian political regime.
Foremost, the findings are consistent with the historical-political construct of “pursuing
national glory” where a peaceful, mighty and expanding Empire serves as a focal source of
power and protection for the communities historically and terrestrially linked to its fate.
Additionally, as a result of the extrapolation of the astroturfing interventions, the study
verifies that the recent rise of nationalism relates directly to the notion of the volunteer
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secessionist movement in the Eastern Ukraine. A somewhat surprising finding is that despite
the overall current authoritative and macho style of governance of the Putin regime, the
mainstream version of the regime is likely to be constantly supplied with filtered content
free from unpleasant and controversial details. Meanwhile, this last observation is easily
explained with another feature of this regime’s embodiment- its populist nature- that gives it
the persuasive power to convince average citizens to accept a personal economic loss for the
belief that unlike the recent past, their sacrifices will enable a reality where greatness will no
longer be contingent on violence and human sacrifice.
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Tables and Figures

Figure 4.1: Soviet Union/Russia’s Role Sets (from Thies and Nieman (2017)
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Figure 4.2: Russian Wikipedia: Pageviews for January 2013 - May 2015.

Figure 4.3: The articles from categories Ukraine, Kiev, and Crimea on Russian Wikipedia:
Pageviews for September 2013 - July 2014
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Figure 4.4: Actual ad from Russian social networks. August 2013 (Garmajalova, 2013)
Translation: "Internet operators are required! Work in a chic office in OLGINO!!!! (m. Staraya derevnya),
payment of 25 960 per month. Task: posting comments on thematic Internet sites, writing thematic posts,
blogs, posts on social networks. Work reports in the form of screen-shots. Work schedule selected individually
... ... Weekly payments, 1180 [rubbles] per shift (from 8.00 to 16.00, from 10.30 to 18.30, from 14.00 to
22.00). WEEKLY PAYMENTS AND FREE MEALS!!! Full-time employment or with a contract (by choice).
Training is possible!".

Figure 4.5: Typical assignment in a “troll factory” (from Volchek and Sindelar (2015))
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Figure 4.6: A joke on the Russian Internet dedicated to political trolls: A banknote of 11
rubles.
Explanation of the details: Eleven (rubles) was the amount of money the Russian political
troll received for one comment. The building on the banknote is the "The Internet
Information Center" on Savushkina in Saint Petersburg. The settlement on the map says
"Olgino", the original location of “the troll factory”.
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Figure 4.7: The troll factories on the map.
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Figure 4.8: The example of the data from the DB-IP database.

Figure 4.9: The DB-IP spatial analysis: The area around Varvarskaya.
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Figure 4.10: The DB-IP spatial analysis: The area around Savushkina.

Figure 4.11: The DB-IP spatial analysis: The area around Yablonovsky.
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Figure 4.12: Wikipedia revisions’ dump: an extract.
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Figure 4.13: Revision’s online page.
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Table 4.1: Geographical coordinates of the troll factories

1
2
3
4
5
6

name
latitude
Olgino
59.99671
Savushkina, 55 59.98433
Zelenyy Gorod 56.16729
Varvarskaya, 32 56.32139
Yablonovsky
44.98674
Perekatny
45.03046

longitude
30.13154
30.27192
44.06608
44.01241
38.94344
38.9449
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IP ranges
0
4
0
3
2
0

detected IPs contributions
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
19
88
0
0

Table 4.2: Suspect IP contributors: Basic Stats
IP
c1

ip range
n articles of the edits
yablonovsky2 26 14 June; 14 June; Georgia; Georgia; Ashgabat; Lipetsk; Sochi;
Seversky Donets; Donetsk (Russia); Cell theory; Dubossary;
Starominskaya; Mr. Credo; Khankarov, Khamzat Zharapovich;
Khankarov, Khamzat Zharapovich; Multiverse (DC Comics)(l);
Pavlov, Sergey Vasilievich; Charlie Hebdo (l); Charlie Hebdo
(l); Charlie Hebdo (l); Charlie Hebdo (l); Charlie Hebdo (l);
Flash (television series, 2014) (l); Flash (television series, 2014)
(l); Flash (television series, 2014) (l); Semenchenko, Semyon
Igorevich
c2 yablonovsky2 24 January 9; Ozon.ru (l); Social Psychology; Yablonovsky
(Adygea); Yablonovsky (Adygea); M Video; Connected (company); Dosage aerosol dispenser; Vettel, Sebastian; Social network; Robinson, Ross; Chia (plant); Stronghold Kingdoms (l);
Prime World (l); War Thunder (l); Blood and Soul (l); Black
Star Inc . (l); Black Star Inc . (l); Star Conflict (l); Star Conflict
(l); Star Conflict (l); Panzar (l); L’One (l); L’One (l)
c3 yablonovsky2 10 Cossacks; Kramatorsk; Economic laws; Yury Dolgoruky; Yury
Dolgoruky; Russians in Kazakhstan; Culture of Ancient Russia; Culture of Ancient Russia; Anti-collector agency; Legal
consultation
c4 yablonovsky2 6 Planet of the Apes (novel); Planet of the Apes (novel); Planet
of the Apes (novel); Planet of the Apes (novel); Planet of the
Apes (novel); Planet of the Apes (novel)
c5 yablonovsky2 4 Manticore (monster); Arianism; Glade; Pozharsky, Dmitry
Mikhailovich
c6 yablonovsky2 2 Malcolm X; Krasnodar musical theater
c7 yablonovsky2 2 Krasnodar; Krasnodar
c8 yablonovsky2 2 International Society for Krishna Consciousness; The International Society for Krishna Consciousness
c8 yablonovsky2 2 Margaritovo (Rostov Region); Margaritovo (Rostov region)
c9 yablonovsky1 1 Minecraft (l)
c10 yablonovsky1 1 Cherkessia
c11 yablonovsky2 1 Steel (stadium, Alchevsk)
c12 yablonovsky2 1 Univer (TV series)
c13 yablonovsky2 1 Clickjacking
c14 yablonovsky2 1 Assolkolai
c15 yablonovsky2 1 Yablonovsky (Adygea)
c16 yablonovsky2 1 Adverb
c17 yablonovsky2 1 Sofia (name)
c18 yablonovsky2 1 Silent Hill 4: The Room (l)
Notes: 1) The IPs are masked in the main text because of the privacy reasons. They are
available by request or can be reconstructed130
through the replication code. 2) The articles
names are originally in Russian; the translated version is provided unless it is explicitly
indicated - latin or l means that the article name was originally in the latin script.

Table 4.3: Suspect IP contributors: Evaluation of the contributions
IP total detected van|d ca|d malicious|nd good edits good edits (%)
c1
26
18
8
10
2
5
15
c2
24
0
0
0
0
24
100
c3
10
7
4
3
3
0
0
c4
6
0
0
0
0
6
100
c5
4
0
0
0
0
4
100
c6
2
0
0
0
0
2
100
c7
2
0
0
0
0
2
100
c8
2
0
0
0
0
2
100
c9
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c10
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c11
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c12
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c13
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c14
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c15
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c16
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c17
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
c18
1
0
0
0
0
1
100
Notes: detected refers to the number of contributions substantively satisfying the criteria of
astroturfing; van|d = vandalism|detected - the vandal contributions that satisfy the criteria
of astroturfing; ca|d = clever astroturfing | detected; malicious contributions that do not
satisfy the conditions of the astroturfing; good edits - the contributions that improve the
quality of an article
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Table 4.4: Detected instances of astroturfing on the Russian Wikipedia (c1)
article
Georgia

type
D
D

Ashgabat

D

Lipetsk

V

Sochi

D

Seversky
Donets

D

Donetsk
(Russia)

D

Cell theory

D

Dubossary

D

Khankarov

V

Pavlov

V

Charlie
Hebdo

V
V

V
D
V
Semenchenko

V

brief description
Removal of information related to Russian occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008
Removal of information related to the anti-Russian uprising (1819),
the demonstration in Georgia (1978), the bloodshed during the
suppression of the demonstration (1989), and the occupation of the
Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In the description of Turkmenistan’s association with the Russian
Empire, the word "conquest" was replaced with "inclusion".
The adjective "bandit" was added to the description of the candy
factory Roshen, which belongs to Poroshenko, the recent president
of Ukraine.
Removal of information of the Circassian genocide at the end of the
Russo-Circassian War in Russia in 1864 – 1867.
Removal of the information that this river served as a border between
the Ukrainian military and the insurgent army in the Eastern
Ukraine in 2014.
Removal of information from the section on famous citizens about
an officer who fought in the White Army during the Civil War and
in the Nazi Army in WW2.
Removal of some information about the scientific achievements of
foreign scientists that could detract from the successes of their
Russian counterparts.
Removal from the famous citizens section the information about
the Kapranowowie brothers, who are famous writers and Ukrainian
nationalists.
In the description of his death, the neutral word "died" was replaced
with a more colloquial term, "sdokh", which delegates a negative
attitude to the deceased person.
In the description, the phrase “prominent figure of the newest Don
history" is replaced with “traitor and criminal”.
In the description, the words “well-known, sketch-cartoonists” were
replaced with “rascals”.
The words "French satirical weekly" were replaced with "French
porn weekly". Also, in the description where the magazine mentions
“ridicules politicians, ultra-rightists, Islam and Christianity” it is also
added “for that they paid when the Islamists killed 12 scoundrels
on the editorial office of this newspaper" (in colloquial language).
The addition of the colloquial expression for "get afraid", pointing
to the threatening disrespect of the people indicated.
The removal of the word "famous" from their description.
The addition of the colloquial expression“ cowardly creatures” to
describe them.
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The addition to the description the terms “a war criminal". The
replacement of his ethnic group from "Russian" to "unknown".

Table 4.5: Detected instances of the atroturfing on Russian Wikipedia (c3)
article
Cossacks
Kramatorsk

type
D
D

Dolgoruky

V
V

Russians
in
Kazakhstan

D

Culture
of Ancient
Russia

V

brief description
The removal of one of the meanings of the word "bandit".
The removal of part of the description of the attacks of the insurgent
army in the city when it was under control of the Ukrainian military.
The misinformation act of replacing "Volyn" to "Volynsk".
The replacement of the actual name of “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign”
with “The Tale of Tortoise’s Campaign”.
The removal of certain details about the reasons why Russians left
Kazakhstan in the beginning of the 1990s. The reason given as
"the loss of privileged status within the USSR" is replaced with
"suppression".
Rewriting a sentence while misspelling several words.

V

Change of a date to a wrong one
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Figure 4.14: The article on Georgia: A typical example of subtle manipulation by deletion.

Figure 4.15: The article on Charlie Hebdo: A typical example of abusive (hate speech)
manipulation .
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Figure 4.16: Time of the day and the date: c1 and c3’s contributions to Wikipedia

Note: The black crosses mark non-astroturfing edits; the blue are the astroturfing edits of
type D; the red crosses - of type V.
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Table 4.6: Detected instances of the atroturfing on Russian Wikipedia: Categories
title (source)
участники первой мировой войны*
персоналии: белое движение*

title (translation)
n
participants of the First World War*
5405
personalities: the white movement (during 803
the Civil War in 1917-1922 in Russia)*
рюриковичи по алфавиту
rurikovichi in alphabetical order
506
384
переименованные населённые пункты renamed settlements of Russia
россии
генералы вермахта
Wehrmacht generals
305
политики украины
policy of Ukraine
282
национальные меньшинства
national minorities
248
выпускники николаевского кавалерий- graduates of the Nikolayev Cavalry School 233
ского училища
пограничные реки
border rivers
233
общественные деятели украины
public figures of ukraine
230
народные депутаты верховной рады people’s deputies of the Verkhovna Rada 218
украины viii созыва
of Ukraine viii convocation
народы россии
peoples of russia
179
реки ростовской области
the river of the Rostov region
176
участники евромайдана
euromaidan participants
172
унитарные государства
unitary states
162
социалистическая пресса
socialist press
125
цитология
cytology
116
основатели городов
founders of cities
114
русские коллаборационисты во второй Russian collaborators in the Second World 112
мировой войне
War
вооружённые силы российской империи armed forces of the Russian Empire
106
кавалерия
cavalry
100
палеолит европы
Paleolithic of Europe
93
административные центры субъектов administrative centers of the subjects of 84
российской федерации
the Russian Federation
притоки дона
tributaries
83
отравленные
poisoned
82
города, основанные в xix веке
cities founded in the xix century
80
объекты книги рекордов гиннесса
objects of the Guinness Book of Records
75
города, основанные в xviii веке
cities founded in the xvi century
74
псевдонмы
aliases
70
Note: * are excluded from the further analysis due to their generality.
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Table 4.7: Detected instances of the atroturfing on Russian Wikipedia: Categories
title (source)
чеченские полевые командиры
казачество
участники грузино-абхазских войн
реки белгородской области
курорты ссср
города молдавии
реки луганской области
сословия
города донецкой области
поп-музыканты
реки харьковской области
великие князья киевские
сатирические журналы
социальная структура русского государства
чеченские поэты
российские военные укрепления
русские в казахстане
приграничные с украиной районы российской федерации
районные центры краснодарского края
скифы
журналы франции
курганы
народы казахстана
военачальники северо-восточной руси
князья ростовские
реки донецкой области
россия при романовых (1613—1917)
военные украины
выпускники донского кадетского корпуса
история республики казахстан (с 1991
года)
экономические законы
краматорск
мономаховичи
города краснодарского края

title (translation)
Chechen field commanders
Cossacks
participants of the Georgian-Abkhaz wars
the rivers of the Belgorod region
resorts ussr
cities of moldavia
the Lugansk region
estates
the cities of Donetsk region
pop musicians
the river of the Kharkov region
the Grand Dukes of Kiev
satirical magazines
social structure of the Russian state

n
68
63
63
62
59
57
54
53
52
48
46
45
44
43

Chechen poets
Russian military fortifications
Russians in Kazakhstan
bordering with Ukraine regions of the
Russian Federation
district centers of the Krasnodar Territory
Scythians
magazines of france
mounds
peoples of Kazakhstan
commanders of north-eastern Russia
princes of Rostov
rivers of the Donetsk region
russia with the novels (1613-1917)
military Ukraine
graduates of the Don Cadet Corps

42
40
38
36

history of the Republic of Kazakhstan
(since 1991)
economic laws
kramatorsk
monomachovichi
city of Krasnodar region
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34
34
31
31
31
30
30
29
29
28
28
27
25
24
24
23

Table 4.8: Detected instances of the atroturfing on Russian Wikipedia: Categories
title (source)
населённые пункты староминского района
города на днестре
вооружённые силы русского государства
грузия
диаспорные группы средней азии
сатирики франции
персоналии:суздаль
районные центры липецкой области
дубоссары
армия русского государства
города воинской славы
населённые пункты краматорского городского совета
курорты федерального значения
липецк
города на северском донце
командиры украинских добровольческих
батальонов
государства постсоветского пространства
биологические теории
культура древней руси
сочи
страны у чёрного моря
ашхабад
курорты приднестровской молдавской
республики
почётные граждане парижа
члены партии «самопомощь»
герои абхазии
города приднестровской молдавской республики
донецк (ростовская область)
переименованные населённые пункты
туркмении
северский донец
стрельба в редакции газеты charlie hebdo
авторы-исполнители чечни
похороненные в церкви спаса на берестове
похороненные в новогрудке

title (translation)
populated areas of the Starominsky
district
cities on the Dniester
armed forces of the Russian state
Georgia
diaspora groups of Central Asia
French satirists
people: suzdal
district centers of the Lipetsk region
Dubossary
army of the Russian state
city of military glory
populated places of the Kramatorsk city
council
resorts of federal importance
Lipetsk
city in the northern part of the Donets
commanders of Ukrainian volunteer
battalions
states of the post-Soviet region
biological theories
the culture of ancient Russia
Sochi
countries near the Black Sea
Ashgabat
resorts of the Transnistrian Moldovan
Republic
honorary citizens of Paris
members of the "self-help"party
heroes of Abkhazia
the city of the Transnistrian Moldovan
Republic
Donetsk (Rostov region)
renamed settlements of Turkmenia
Seversky Donets
Charlie Hebdo
authors/executors of Chechnya
buried in the church of Spas on Berestov
buried in Novogrudka
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n
21
19
18
18
17
17
16
16
15
14
14
14
13
13
12
12
10
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
2

Table 4.9: Initial astroturfing contributions: Dictionary arranged by the frequency of the
used terms (I)
stem
теор
росс
шван
клетк
украин
семенченк
груз
клеточн
структур
животн
краматорск
территор
раст
обстрел
республик
батальон
донбасс
работ
оккупир
част
войн
элементарн
обс
обществ
экономическ
русск
июн
украинск
во
известн
крым
половин
александр
черкес
кавказск
исследов
клеток
микроскопическ
соответств
шлейд
отказ
карикатур

n
9
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

stem
пророк
июл
февр
сист
дет
русл
некотор
сем
род
командир
парт
прож
европейск
комисс
кавказ
российск
правительств
южн
границ
стран
мир
липецк
сокол
комп
вод
жив
кубанск
полож
сравн
доказ
гор
карачун
сил
донецк
закон
рамк
определ
сост
главн
представител
сообщ
орг

n stem
4 числ
3 безопасн
3 казахст
3 игоревич
3 укр
3 им
3 политическ
3 майд
3 верховн
3 рад
3 соз
3 самопомощ
3 стб
3 сентябр
3 родственник
3 брат
3 переж
3 откр
3 публик
3 ус
3 выполн
3 успешн
3 факт
3 нов
3 цитат
3 продолж
3 грузинск
3 абхаз
3 осет
3 регион
2 укрепл
2 явл
2 гагрск
2 бзыбск
2 завоев
2 свободн
2 завод
2 лебедянск
2 прогресс
2 центр
2 изд
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2 рескрипт

n
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

stem
чтко
полн
бож
оконч
враждебн
горц
последн
насел
матер
турц
засел
западн
казак
переселенц
велик
княз
мих
николаевич
склон
отряд
труп
женщин
собак
болезн
едв
берег
мал
выбрас
луганск
народн
классическ
оказ
генл
принцип
стро
рост
ядр
основн
бесструктурн
веществ
сочин
книг

n
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Table 4.10: Initial astroturfing contributions: Dictionary arranged by the frequency of used
terms (II)
stem
хорд
хрящ
показ
век
впоследствиикогд
банд
власт
днр
вооружн
всу
подверг
внешн
годовщин
освобожд
видеорепортаж
реактивн
залп
огн
рсзо
оперативн
отчт
специальн
мониторинг
мисс
смм
отчет
сми
боцюрк
майкл
гуд
ирин
госадминстрац
погибл
пострад
жертв
трагед
доног
наряд
разорв
ввод
кажд

n
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

stem
n
объективн
1
обусловл
1
чм
1
функц
1
волын
1
игор
1
кор
1
медл
1
темп
1
потер
1
привилегир
1
статус
1
ссср
1
террористическ
1
группировк
1
террорист
1
глав
1
общин
1
юр
1
бунак
1
утвержд
1
виктор
1
пугач
1
соратник
1
явн
1
психическ
1
ненормальн
1
организац
1
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